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Abstract 
The calculus of constructions is formulated as a natural deduction system in which deductions 
follow the constructions of the terms to which types are assigned. Strong normalization is proved 
for deductions. This strong normalization result implies the consistency of the underlying system, 
but it is still possible to make contradictory assumptions. A number of assumption sets useful 
in implementations are proved consistent, including certain sets of assumptions whose types are 
negations, negations of certain equations, arithmetic, classical logic, classical arithmetic, and the 
existence of power sets. All results are given with complete proofs. 
The calculus of constructions of Thierry Coquand [5, 7-l l] is a system of typed 
I-calculus in which the second-order polymorphic typed A-calculus can be interpreted. 
Furthermore, using the formulas-as-types notion [19], it is possible to interpret con- 
structive higher-order logic in it. It differs from the type theory of Martin-LGf [27-291 
in two important ways: it is impredicative, and it has only a small number of primitive 
axioms and rules. Coquand proved [5] the normalization theorem and later [7, 1 l] the 
strong normalization theorem for it. He also showed [6] that any of several natural 
looking extensions of the calculus is inconsistent. (More recently, Luo [22, 231 has 
shown that the calculus of constructions can be consistently extended in an interest- 
ing way by adding an infinite hierarchy of type universes, but this extension will not 
concern us here.) 
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In [37, Chs. 4 and 51, I gave a proof of the strong normalization theorem for 
deductions (rather than for terms) of a version of the calculus of constructions. The 
version is a natural deduction system in the style of Gentzen in which the deductions 
follow the formation of the terms to which types are being assigned. The normalization 
theorem for terms follows from that for deductions. I also proved consistent the result 
of adding certain assumptions (in the form of premises for mathematical theories). 
More recent versions of these results are stated without proof in [38], while some new 
results along these lines are given in [39]. Here, these results will be given with full 
proofs. 
We shall begin in Section 1 with the formulation of the system. In Section 2 we 
shall take up its basic metatheory; because of the formulation, some results which 
are trivial for the formulation of Coquand require nontrivial proofs. In Section 3 
we shall give the proof of the strong normalization theorem for deductions; its 
basic consequences will be given in Section 4. In Section 5 we shall compare the 
formulation of Section 1 with other formulations closer to those of Coquand and 
Huet. In Section 6 we shall consider representing logic with equality. In Section 7 
we shall discuss the addition of assumptions for mathematics and logic and define 
some weak sets of assumptions that are provably consistent. In Section 8 we look 
at negations of equations and conditions for them to be consistent. In Section 9 
it is shown that assumptions ufficient for arithmetic are consistent, and these re- 
sults are applied to other inductively generated free algebras, in particular to lists. In 
Section 10, it is shown that an assumption sufficient for classical ogic is consistent 
by itself and together with the assumptions needed for arithmetic. Finally, in Sec- 
tion 11, we look at sets; Huet [20, Ch. 12; 211 has given an interpretation of the 
language of sets which is natural but in which the power set of a set is never a 
set, and here assumptions which allow many power sets to be sets are shown to be 
consistent. 
1. Natural deduction formulation of the calculus 
We begin with terms which are built up from variables w, x, y, z, ~1, . . . and the 
constants Prop and Type in the following way: 
1. Variables and constants are terms. 
2. If X and Y are terms, then so are (XY), (Ax : X. Y), and (Vx : X)Y. 
In (Ax : X. Y) and (Vx : X)Y, the variable x is bound to the left of the colon and 
in Y, but not in X (where in practice it does not occur). [X/x]Y will be the result of 
substituting X for the free occurrences of x in Y, bound variables being changed as 
necessary in order to avoid capture. We shall follow the usual practice of identifying 
terms that differ only by alphabetical changes of bound variables. 
Remark 1. If we represent the type (Vx : X)Y by Gx(~x. Y), then we have a system 
of generalized-type assignment in the sense of Curry. See [18, Sections 16C-E]. 
J.P. Seldinl Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 83 (1997) 23-101 25 
Remark 2. In a typed system, it is the intention that [X,,x]Y be meaningtil only if 
X and x have the same type. However, when we define type assignment by a set of 
rules which depends on substitution being previously defined, as we are doing here, 
we cannot make this condition part of the definition of substitution. 
Remark 3. When a system like this is implemented, there are complications that are 
not considered here. Coquand and Huet use in their publications a system for represent- 
ing these terms due to de Bruijn [ 151 in which terms which differ only by alphabetic 
changes of bound variables are really identical. For another such system for represent- 
ing terms, see [34]. 
From now on, capital letters will denote terms. FV(X) will be the set of free vari- 
ables in X. 
A term of the form (LX : A .M)N is called a redex and [N/x]M is called its con- 
tractum. With these definitions, reduction and conversion are defined in the way 
usual for A-calculus, and we shall denote them by D and =* (as in [18]). Note 
that although this corresponds to P-reduction rather than q-reduction, it is not iden- 
tical to P-reduction (because the syntax involves giving explicitly the types of vari- 
ables bound by 1). We will not be considering here a reduction corresponding to 
rl-reduction. 
Remark 4. Suppose we do consider a reduction corresponding to q-reduction, and 
consider the term Lc : y . (lx : z .x)x. It would be natural to think of this as an q- 
redex with contracturn Ix : z .x. But the term has a subterm (ix : z .x)x, which, by 
the above definition, is a redex with contractum X, and contracting this redex in the 
original term leads to ;Ix : y .x. Now Ax : z .x and 1x : y .x are both in normal form, 
and they are clearly distinct. Thus, adding these “q-redexes” would lead to a failure of 
the Church-Rosser Theorem. This example appears in [3 1, p. 711. 
The Church-Rosser Theorem holds for this reduction, as is proved in [25] and [14, 
Ch. 21. 
The formulas of all the formulations we consider will be of the form M : A, where 
A4 and A are terms. The letters E, F, G, El, etc. will be used for formulas. 
Type assumptions are sequences of the form x0 : Ao, . . . ,x, : A,,, where x0,. . . ,x, are 
variables and A 0,. . . , A, are terms. Capital Greek letters will denote type assumptions. 
The two constants Prop and Type are called kinds. The lower case Greek letters K 
and K' will be used for variables that range over kinds. Thus, K and K’ are each either 
Prop or Type. 
Definition 1. The system TOCO is a natural deduction system the steps of whose 
deductions are formulas. It has one axiom, namely 
(PT) Prop : Type 
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The rules are as follows: 
(KK’ F) If x does not occur free in A or in any undischarged assumption, 
[x:A] 
A:K B : JC’ 
(Vx : A)B : K’, 
(Eq’K) 
A:K A=*B 
B : K, 
M : (Vx : A)B N:A 
MN : [N/x]& 
(VKi) Zf x does not occur free in A or in any undischarged assumption, 
[x:A] 
M:B A:K 
ix : A .M : (Vx : A)B, 
(W’) 
M:A A=*B 
M : B. 
If Z is a sequence of assumptions, then Z FM : A holds in TOCO if there is a deduction 
whose last formula is A4 : A and in which every undischarged assumption occurs in Z. 
In [37-391, (KK’F) is called (KK’Formation). 
In writing out deductions, we shall omit the second premise of rules (Eq’K) and 
(Eq”), since it can be easily inferred from the other premise and the conclusion. 
2. The basic metatheory 
TOCO differs from other typed lambda-calculi in that the types are determined by 
the deductive rules. The intention is, however, that types will be terms A such that 
A : K can be proved for some kind K. As we shall see, this idea will have to be 
slightly generalized, but it will do as a first approximation. As it happens, the rules of 
TOCO strictly limit the terms that can be proved to have Type as a type. To state the 
required result, we need a definition: 
Definition 2. Terms which convert to the form 
(Vxi : Al )(VX~ : AZ). . . (Vxn : A,)Prop 
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are called contexts. Terms which convert to the form 
Q/xl : A1)(Vx2 : AZ). . . (Vx,, : A,)Type 
are called supercontexts. In the presence of an assumption of the form 
x : (Vyl : Bl)(Vy2 : B2). . . (Vy, : B,)Type, 
and deductions of Ml : Bl,M2 : Bz,. . . , M,,, : B,, terms which convert to the form 
(Vx, : AI)(Vx2 : A2)...(Vxn : A,)(xMlM2...M,,,) 
are called generalized contexts (with tail variable x). The given form of each of 
these kinds of term is called its standard form of the term, n is called its index, and 
Al,A2,. . . ,A, are called its pre$x types. A context function [respectively supercon- 
text function, generalized context function] of degree k is a term A such that for 
terms Ml,Mz,... ,Mk of appropriate types, AMlM2,. . . ,Mk is a context [respectively 
supercontext, generalized context]. 
If A’ is the standard form of a context [respectively supercontext, generalized con- 
text], then 
Ax,:A,.h2:A2 . . . . . kck:Ak.A’ 
is a context [respectively supercontext, generalized context] function of degree k. Once 
we have proved the normalization theorem, we shall see that the normal form of every 
context function either has this form or else is a generalized context function of the 
form xMlM2 . . .Mj, where x is a variable which is also a generalized context function 
of degree j + k. 
It follows from the Church-Rosser Theorem that two standard forms can be the 
standard form of the same context, generalized context, or supercontext if and only 
if they have the same index, the prefix types are convertible, and, in the case of a 
generalized context, the tail variable is the same, the number of its arguments is the 
same, the corresponding arguments are convertible. It also follows that no one of these 
three types of term converts to any other. 
Noting that Type is a supercontext, we can state the result we want as follows. 
Theorem 1. Zf, for any set of assumptions r, 
l-l-A:B, 
where B is a supercontext of index k, then A is a context function or a generalized 
context function of degree k. 
Proof. By induction on the length of the deduction of r FA : B. For the basis, note 
that if A : B is an instance of the axiom, then B is Type, a supercontext of index 0, 
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and A is Prop, which is a context (a context function of degree 0), while if A : B is 
an assumption, then A is a variable which, under Definition 2, is a generalized context 
function of degree k. For the induction step, note that if the type in the conclusion of 
any rule except (MC’ F) is a context, then so is the type in the appropriate premise 
(the left premise of every rule except (WC’ F), where it is the right premise), so by 
the induction hypothesis the term in this premise satisfies the theorem, and hence so 
does the term in the conclusion of the rule. (Note that if the rule is (JCIC’ F) or (Eq’rc), 
then B is Type, which is a supercontext of index 0, and in this case A is a context 
or a generalized context.) 0 
Corollary 1.1. IA for any set of assumptions r,
r FA : Type, 
then A is a context or a generalized context. 
Now consider the conditions for the discharge of assumptions. In order to discharge 
a sequence of assumptions 
x1 : A1,xZ : A~,...,x,, : A, 
in reverse order, we need the following conditions for each i, 1 <i <n: 
1. xi does not occur free in Al , . . . ,Ai (but it may occur free in Ai+l,. . . , A,,), and 
2. x1 : A l,...,xi_l : Ai- FAi : K. 
Since we will also want supercontexts among the types of assumptions, this leads to 
the following definition. 
Definition 3. A sequence of assumptions 
is a well-formed environment provided that the following conditions hold for each i, 
1 Gi<n: 
1. xi does not occur free in Al , . . . ,Ai (but it may occur free in Ai+l,. . .y A,), and 
2. if Ai is not a supercontext, then xi : Al,. . . ,xi_l : Ai- FAi : K. 
To get a partial converse to Corollary 1.1, note that to a standard form of any context 
or generalized context with prefix types Al, AZ,. . . , A,,, there corresponds a sequence of 
assumptions 
x1 : Al,x2 : AZ,. . .,x,, : A,. 
Definition 4. A standard form of a context or generalized context is said to be well- 
formed if and only if the corresponding sequence of assumptions i a well-formed 
environment and none of the prefix types is a supercontext. 
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Theorem 2. If A is a context or generalized context with a well formed standard 
form, then 
r t-A : Type, 
where r is void if A is a context and consists of the assumptions needed to assign 
types to the tail variable of A and its arguments if A is a generalized context, 
Proof. Suppose the well formed standard form of A is 
(kt : A,)(Vx2 : Az)...(Yxk, : A,)B. 
If A is a context, then B = Prop, and so B : Type is an instance of the axiom. If A 
is a generalized context and r is as in the theorem, then r tB : Type. In either case, 
l-,x, : AI,xZ : A2 ,..., X, : A,l-B: Type. 
The theorem follows by repeated inferences by (XT F), which are valid by the as- 
sumptions of the theorem. 0 
Theorem 3. (a) If r is a well-formed environment and if 
TkM:A, 
then M reduces to a term in which there is no occurrence of Type. 
(b) If r is a well formed environment and if 
TFM:A, 
by a deduction from which it can be determined that there is an occurrence of Type 
in every term to which A reduces, then A is a supercontext. 
Proof. (a) By induction on the deduction of 
rb--MIA. 
In the cases for rules (Eq’K), the conclusion follows via the Church-Rosser Theorem 
and the fact that no reduction can introduce an occurrence of Type into a term. The 
remaining cases are easy. 
(b) By induction on the deduction of 
The only difficult case is that for rule (Ve); in this case, suppose that the last inference 
is 
M : (Vx : B)C 
MN : [N/x]C. 
N ’ B (Ye) 
If it can be determined from the deduction that there is an occurrence of Type in every 
term to which [N/x]C reduces, then since by (a) N reduces to a term in which there is 
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no occurrence of Type, it follows that there is an occurrence of Type in every term 
to which C reduces. Hence, there is an occurrence of Type in every term to which 
(Vx : B)C reduces. Thus, by the induction hypothesis (on the left premise), (Vx : B)C 
is a supercontext. It follows that C, and hence also [N/x]C, is a supercontext. q 
An occurrence of a subterm A of a term M is said to be the type of a bound variable 
if A is the indicated part of a subterm of the form Ix : A. N or (Vx : A)B. 
If A is a generalized context with standard form 
(Vx, : Al)(Vxk2 : A2)...(Vxn : A,)(xM&...M,), 
then xMiM2 . . .M, is called a generalized Prop-term. 
Theorem 4. Let r be a well-formed environment, and suppose 
by a deduction from which it is not possible to determine that A is a supercontext. 
Then M =* N for some term N in which every occurrence of Prop or a generalized 
Prop-term is inside the type of a bound variable. 
Remark. Saying that it is not possible to determine from a deduction that A is a 
supercontext means that A is not a type in a branch of a deduction that occurs above 
or below a step which would require a subterm of A to be Type in such a way 
that A itself would be a supercontext. In other words, it means that as far as the 
given deduction is concerned, there is nothing in any of the inference steps that would 
prevent A being replaced by some term which is known not to be a supercontext. This 
property is thus decidable. 
Proof. By induction on the deduction of r FM : A. 0 
Corollary 4.1. If r is a well-formed environment, and if 
rt--M:A, 
by a deduction from which it is not possible to determine that A is a supercontext, 
then M is neither a context function nor a generalized context function. 
Corollary 4.2. If T is a well-formed environment, and if 
rhbf:K and rtkf:d, 
then K E K'. 
Proof. Otherwise, we have both r F-M : Prop and r tM : Type, from which we get 
by Theorem 1 that A4 is a context function or generalized context function and from 
Corollary 4.1 that this is not the case. 0 
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TOCO has the property that deductions follow the construction of the terms to which 
they assign types. Curry called this the subject construction property; see [ 12, Corollary 
9B1; 13, Theorem 14Dl; 18, Note 14.18, Note 15.12, Remark 16.371. This, in turn, 
means that it is reasonable to expect that there is a natural transformation on deductions 
corresponding to the reduction of a term. It turns out that there is such a transformation, 
but it depends on the subject-reduction theorem [ 18, Theorem 16.411, which, in turn, 
depends on the replacement lemma [ 18, Lemma 16.391. The latter result is substantial 
enough to be called a theorem here. 
Theorem 5. Let rl be any weli formed environment, and let 9 be a deduction of 
I-, tM : A. 
Let V : C be any statement in 9, let $21 be that part of 9 ending in V : C, let 
92 be the rest of 9, and let x1 : BI,x~ : Bz,.. .,x, : B, be the assumptions in 91 
that are discharged in 232 and let yl : Cl, yz : C2, . . . , y,,, : C,,, be the assumptions 
in 92 discharged in 92. Let W be a term such that W =* V, and suppose that r2 
is a well-formed environment in which x1,x2,. . ,x,, yl, ~2,. . , y,,, do not occur free. 
Suppose that 93 is a deduction of 
r2,x1 : Bl,x2 : B2 ,..., x, : B, k W : C. 
Then replacing 91 by 93 in 9 results in a deduction 9~ of 
r,,r2 tM* : A, 
where M* is obtained from M by replacing appropriate occurrences of V by W. 
Remark. It is difficult to describe exactly the replacements which are required to obtain 
M* from M, but it is possible to read the replacement process from the proof. It is 
worth noting that the part of 94 which is not included in 93 has exactly the same 
inference rules in the same relative positions as 92 except perhaps for some inferences 
by (Eq’rc) or (Eq”). 
Proof. By induction on the structure of 92. 
Basis: There are two cases. 
Case 1: 92 consists of the single statement V : C. Then M is V, M* is W, and 94 
is just 93. 
Case 2: 92 consists only of the axiom (PT). Then the replacement is vacuous, 
M* G A4 = Prop, and Qa4 consists only of the axiom (PT). 
Induction step: We have the following cases depending on the last inference in 
92. 
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Case 1: The last inference of $9~ is by (KK’ F). Then A is K’, it4 is (Vx : B)E, and 
9 is 
[X f B] 
95 96(x) 
B:K 
E:K’(~~‘F-l) 
(Vx : B)E : K’, 
where the occurrence of V : C is either in $95 or in gb(x). By the induction hypothesis, 
the replacement of 9, by 58s in g5 and !&j(x) leads to deduction 97 and 9s(x) of, 
respectively, 
r,,rl tB* : K 
and 
r,,r2,x : Bl-E* : K’ 
for appropriate B* and E*. Now x, because it is discharged in 92, is either one of the 
xi or else it is one of the yj, and hence it does not occur free in r2. (It clearly does 
not occur in ri.) Since V =.+ W, B* =* B, and so 94 is as follows: 
[x fs] 
E (Eq’rc) 
98(x) 
E*:K’(KK’F-_l) 
(Vx : B)E* : K’. 
Case 2: The last inference in 9 is by (Eq’x). Then A is K and 9 is 
935 
E (Eq’rc) 
. 9 
where N =* M. By the induction hypothesis, the replacement of 9, by 9s in 95 leads 
to a deduction 96 of 
r,,r2w* : K 
for an appropriate N*. Since N* =* N =* M, we can take M* = M, and then 594 is 
obtained from 96 by an inference by (Eq’rc). 
Case 3: The last inference of 9 is by (V/e). Then M is MlM2, A is [Mz/x]A’, and 
9 is 
95 96 
M, : (Vx : B)A’ 
M2 ’ B (Ve) 
MlM2 : [M2/xJA’. 
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By the induction hypothesis, the replacement of 231 by 93 in 525 and 96 leads to 
deductions 97 and 9s of 
r,, l-2 EM:: : (Vx : B)A’ 
and 
f,,r2tM; : B 
respectively, for appropriate M;” and M2 . * Furthermore, M;” =.+ M2. Hence, 94 is 
Case 4: The last inference of 9 is by (Vrci). Then A is (Vx : B)E, M is ix : B . N, 
and 53 is 
%(x) 96 
N:E 
B’K(Vri - 1) 
ix: B.N : (Vx: B)E. 
By the induction hypothesis, the replacement of $31 by 9~ in 95(x) and $36 leads to 
deductions 97 and 9s of 
r,,r2,x : BkN* : E 
and 
respectively, for appropriate N* and B*, where B* =* B. By hypothesis, x does not 
occur free in r,, r2. Then 5Sd is as follows: 
[x :B] 98 
97(x) 
N*:E 
Ix : B _ N* : (Vx : B)E. 
Case 5: The last inference of 9 is by (Eq”). Then 9 is 
$+ (Eq”) 
. , 
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where A =* B. By the induction hypothesis, the replacement of 91 in 93 in 95 leads 
to a deduction 96 of 
for appropriate M*, and 94 is obtained by adding an inference by (Eq”) at the end. 
0 
It is now possible to prove the subject-reduction theorem. 
Theorem 6. Let r be a well formed environment. rf
(1) I-!-M:A 
and M D N, then 
(2) l-EN :A. 
Proof. By Theorem 5, it is sufficient o prove the theorem for the case in which M is 
a redex and N its contractum. Thus, suppose M = (Lx : B . MI )A42 and N E [Mz/x]Mi . 
By the subject-construction property, (1) is the conclusion of an inference by (Ve) 
whose premises are 
(3) rth : B.Ml : (Vx : B)E 
and 
(4) rt44, : B, 
where A = [MJx]E. (It might be that (1) is the conclusion of an inference by (Eq”), 
but then we need only delete that inference to get to the case given above. Note that 
the transitivity of =.+ makes it possible to eliminate successive inferences by either 
(Eq’rc) or (Eq”).) By the subject-reduction property again, (3) is the conclusion of an 
inference by (Eq”) whose premise is 
dx:B.Ml :(Vx:B’)E’, 
where B’ =* B and El=* E, and this, in turn, must be the conclusion of an inference 
by (Vrci) whose premise is 
(5) T,x : B’t-Ml : E’, 
where x does not occur free in r. Then (2) follows by (4) and (5) and Theorem 5. 
0 
(Cf. [18, Theorems 15.17, 16.411.) This theorem is closely related to the reduction 
steps on deductions: 
Deduction reductions. A deduction of the form 
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[x IA] 
%(x1 92 
M:B 
A’K(Vrci-l) 
Lx:A.M:(b’x:A)B 
2x : A .A4 : (Vx : C)D 
(Ed’) 
(Ax : A .M)N : [N/x]D 
94 
reduces to 
N:C 
N:A 0%” 1
%W) 
[N/x]M : [N/x]B 
(Ed’) 
[N/x]M : [N/x]D 
$3 
93 
N:C 
~ (W 
where 9: is obtained from 94 by replacing appropriate occurrences of (2x : A .M)N 
by [N/x]M. The formula ,4x : A .M : (Yx : A)B is called the cut formula of the 
reduction step. A reduction is a (possibly empty) sequence of replacements using these 
reduction steps. 
A special case of a deduction reduction is a context reduction step or c-reduction 
step, in which the type of the cut formula is a context, a supercontext, or a generalized 
context. A context reduction or c-reduction is a reduction in which each reduction step 
is a c-reduction step. A deduction will be said to be context normalized or c-normalized 
if it contains no cut formulas whose types are contexts or supercontexts (i.e., if no c- 
reduction steps are possible). It turns out to be easy to prove that every deduction can 
be reduced to a c-normalized deduction using the notion of the complexity of a term, 
and that this partial normalization result is important in proving the full normalization 
theorem. 
Remark 5. What is here called the ‘complexity’ of a term was called the ‘degree’ 
of a term in [37], but here the word ‘degree’ refers to the number of arguments of 
a context function [respectively supercontext function, generalized context function] 
needs to become a context [respectively supercontext, generalized context], and so it 
is better to change the term used for this notion. 
Definition 5. Let A be a term such that there is a step A4 : A in a deduction in TOCO. 
Then the complexity of A relative to the deduction is as follows: 
(a) if A is not a context, a supercontext, or a generalized context, then the complexity 
of A is 0; 
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(b) the complexity of Prop, Type, and of a generalized context of the form 
xM,Mz . ..M. is 1; 
(c) the complexity of (Vx : A)B is one more than the maximum of the complexities 
of A and B; and 
(d) if A =* B, then the complexity of A is equal to the complexity of B. 
Since only contexts, supercontexts, and generalized contexts have nonzero complex- 
ity, the degree of a term relative to a deduction is well-defined. 
Remark 6. In general, it is not decidable whether a term is a context, a supercontext, 
or a generalized context. However, in this definition, what is needed is that the term 
does not need to be a context or supercontext or generalized context for the deduction 
to be valid, and given a deduction this is decidable. 
Theorem 7. Every deduction in TOCO with conclusion M : A can be reduced to a 
c-normalized deduction with the same undischarged assumptions and with conclusion 
N : A where M D N. 
Proof. Let the complexity of a cut formula be the complexity of its type with respect o 
the deduction. Let the index of a deduction be the pair (c, n), where c is the maximum 
complexity of any cut formula and n is the number of cut formulas in the deduction 
with complexity d. Let the pairs be ordered by specifying that (c,n) < (c’,n’) if either 
c < c’ or c = c’ and n < n’. At each step, choose a cut formula of complexity c such 
that there is no cut formula of complexity c either above the cut formula or above 
the minor (right) premise for the inference by (Ve) for which the cut formula is the 
major (left) premise. An examination of the deduction that results from applying this 
c-reduction step shows that there is one less cut formula with complexity c, so that if, 
in the original deduction, n > 1, then the index of the resulting deduction is (c,n - 1); 
otherwise, the index of the resulting deduction is (d,m) for some m and for some 
d < c. It follows that the index of the resulting deduction is less than the index of 
the original deduction. Since this is true for any c-reduction step satisfying the above 
conditions, the process must terminate. But if a c-reduction step is possible, then it 
is always possible to find a c-reduction step satisfying these conditions. Hence, every 
deduction can be c-reduced to a c-normalized eduction. In this reduction, the term in 
the conclusion is reduced. q 
Definition 6. The term N of Theorem 7 will be called a c-normal form of M. 
In terms of this definition, Theorem 7 says that every term to which a type is 
assigned by TOCO has a c-normal form. This fact makes it possible to prove for terms 
whose type is Prop some of the properties we have for terms whose type is Type. 
We start with some lemmas: 
Lemma 1. Let 9 be a c-normal deduction of 
Tt-A : Prop, 
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where T is a well-formed environment. Then either A =* (Vx : B)C for terms B 
and C and a variable x which does not occur free in r, or A =*xM,Mz . . .MP for 
a variable x, a natural number p (which may be 0), and some terms Ml,M2,...MP, 
and furthermore it can be decided constructively which of these alternatives 
holds. 
Proof. Consider the last inference in 9 which is not be (Eq”) or (Eq’P). This inference 
cannot be by (Vrci) since the type of the conclusion is an atomic constant, so the only 
possible rules are (wP F) and (Ve). Which of these rules it is can be determined 
constructively by an inspection of the deduction. 
If the inference is by (JCP F), then the second alternative holds. 
If the inference is by (Ve), then consider the left branch of the deduction. As we 
proceed upwards from the last inference, the only rules we can find are by (Ve) or 
(Eq”); for otherwise we would come to an inference by (kci) whose conclusion is a 
context, contradicting the assumption that the deduction is c-normal. The formula at 
the top of this branch cannot be discharged, and so it must be in r. It follows that this 
formula must have the form x : B where B =* @‘XI : Cl)(Vxz : (2,). . . (Vxp : C,)Prop 
for some natural number p (which may be 0), and so we must have the first alternative 
of the theorem. q 
Definition 7. If 9 is a deduction as in Lemma 1, then it is called compound if the 
first case of the lemma holds and simple if the second case holds. If A is a term such 
that A : Prop is the conclusion of such a deduction 9, then A will be called simple 
or compound according to whether 9 is simple or compound. 
Lemma 2. If there is a deduction of 
then there is a c-normal deduction of it. 
Proof. Let 9 be the given deduction. By Theorem 7 there is a c-normal deduction of 
TkB : Prop, 
where A D B. By adding one inference by (Eq’P) at the end, we get the desired 
c-normal deduction of 
Tt-A : Prop. 0 
By Lemma 2 and Definition 7, every type in Prop (with respect o a given well- 
formed environment) is either simple or compound, and it is possible to decide con- 
structively which it is. Furthermore, the compound types are formed by repeated use 
of the operation V from the simple types and Prop. Note that the contexts are formed 
in more or less the same way. 
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Lemma 3. Zf 9 is a deduction of 
Z k(Vx : A)B : Prop, 
where x does not occur free in Z or in A and where Z is a well formed-environment, 
then there is a deduction 9’ of 
Z,x : A kB : Prop. 
Furthermore, the c-normal deduction to which $8 reduces has fewer inferences by 
rules other than (Eq”) and (Eq’K) than the c-normal deduction to which 9 reduces. 
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. 0 
Theorem 8. Zf 
where Z is a well-formed environment, then exactly one of the following holds: 
1. TkA : Prop, 
2. r kA : T, where T is a supercontext, or 
3. A is a supercontext. 
Proof. By induction on the length of the deduction 9 with the conclusion M : A. The 
only difficult case is that in which the last inference of 9 is by rule (Ve). In this case, 
A4 = PN, A z [N/x]C, and 9 has the form 
91 92 
P : (Vx : B)C 
PN : [N/x]C. 
N ’ B (Ve) 
By the induction hypothesis, exactly one of the following holds: 
1. rk(Vx : B)C : Prop, 
2. r k (Vx : B)C : T, where T is a supercontext, or
3. (Vx : B)C is a supercontext. 
This gives us three subcases. 
Subcase 1: By Lemma 3, there is a deduction of 
x:B 
Wx ) 
C : Prop. 
Then we get case 1 of the theorem as follows: 
92 
N:B 
g’(N) 
[N/x]C : Prop. 
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Subcase 2: The last non-(Eq”) inference in the deduction of 
rk(vx : B)C : T 
must be (KTF). Then 
T =* Type 
and the deduction is 
[x fs] 
93 94(x) 
B:K 
’ : Type (aTF - 1). 
(Vx : B)C : Type. 
We get case 2 of the theorem as follows: 
92 
N:B 
94(N) 
[N/x]C : Type. 
Subcase 3: If (Vx : B)C is a supercontext, then so is C, and hence, so also is 
[N/x]C. 0 
Lemmas 1 and 2 give us a structure on the types in Prop. It is interesting to note 
that the other types have exactly the same structure. By Theorem 8, every type is in 
Prop or Type or is a supercontext. It is clear from the definition that supercontexts 
have this structure, and Corollary 1 .l tells us that the same is true for contexts. What 
all of this means is that types are built up from Type, Prop, and the simple types by 
the operation of forming (Vx : A)B. 
Corollary 1.1 and Theorems 2 and 8 allow us to classify all formulas which can be 
deduced from well-formed environments. 
Definition 8. A formula M : A is called: 
(a) a context function if A is a supercontext; 
(b) a context if A =* Type; 
(c) a proposition function if A is a context; 
(d) a proposition if A =* Prop; and 
(e) a proof if A is neither a context nor a supercontext. 
A deduction whose undischarged assumptions form a well-formed environment is clas- 
sified according to its last formula. 
This classification shows the connection between TOCO and the formulas-as-types 
isomorphism. 
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We would like to extend this classification to the terms M (at least relative to a 
given well-formed environment). In other words, we modify Definition 8 as follows. 
Definition 9. A term M is called: 
(a) a f-context function if there is a supercontext A such that r FM : A; 
(b) a r-context if T/--M : Type; 
(c) a r-proposition function if there is a context A such that r l--M : A; 
(d) a r-proposition if TkM : Prop; and 
(e) a r-proof if there is a term A which is neither a context nor a supercontext such 
that TIM : A. 
We have already proved (Corollary 4.1) that no term is both a r-context function 
and a r-proposition function or both a r-context function and a r-proof. To complete 
the proof that this classification is exclusive, we need the following result. 
Theorem 9. If r is a well-formed environment, and ij 
TI-M:A and Tt-M’:B, 
are both derivable, where M and M’ d@er only by changes of bound variables, then 
A=,B. 
Proof. By induction on the lengths of the two deductions, 9, and 92, respectively. 
Case 1: The last inference in 931 is by (Eq”). Assume that the left premise is M : A’. 
By the induction hypothesis, A’ =* B. But A =* A’, and so A =* B. 
Case 2: The last inference in 69~ is by (Eq”). Symmetric to Case 1. 
Case 3: The last inference in neither 91 nor 92 is by (Eq”). 
Subcase 3.1: 9’1 consists of the axiom. Then M is Prop and A is Type. Then either 
$32 is also the axiom, in which case B is Type and we are finished, or else the last 
inference in 92 is by rule (Eq’rc), in which case 1~ is Type by Corollary 4.1. 
Subcase 3.2: The last inference of 91 is by (KK’F). Then B is K’ by Corollary 4.1. 
Subcase 3.3: The last inference of 91 is by (Eq’rc). Then by Corollary 4.1, B is K. 
Subcase 3.4: The last inference of 91 is by (Ve). Then the last inference of 9~ 
is either (Ve) or (Eq’rc). If it is (Eq’rc), then the theorem follows by Corollary 4.2. 
Otherwise, M is NP, M’ is N’P’ (where N’ and P’ differ from N and P only by 
changes in bound variables), A is [P/x$4’, B is [P/x]B’, 91 is 
911 912 
N : (Vx : C)A’ 
NP : [Pfx]A’, 
” ’ (Ve) 
and 92 is 
921 922 
N : (Vx : D)B’ 
NP : [P/x]B’. 
” B (Ve) 
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By the induction hypothesis, C =* D and (Vx : C)A’ =* (Vx : D)B’. It follows that 
A’ =* B’, and hence A=, B. 
Subcase 3.5: The last inference in $91 is by (Vrci). Then the last inference in 92 
is by (Vrci), M is Ax : C. N, M’ is Lx : C. N’ where N and N’ differ by changes in 
bound variables, A is (Vx : CM’, and B’ is (Vx : C)B’. (There is no loss of generality 
in assuming that the indicated bound variable is x in both M and M’ because if the 
bound variables are different a minor modification of 92 will make them the same.) 
Furthermore, 91 is 
911 
N:A’ C:K (VKi- 1) 
Ix : C. N : (‘dx : C)A’ 
Ix : C.N’ : (Vx 
’ ’ Ic’ (VK’i _ 1) 
: C)B’. 
By the induction hypothesis, A’ =.+ B’, and it clearly follows that A =.+ B. Cl 
Corollary 9.1. For any well-formed environment r, no term is both a r-proposition 
function and a r-proof 
Proof. Suppose M is both a Z-proposition function and a r-proof. Then there is a 
Z-proposition B and a r-context C such that 
Zt-M:BandZtM:C. 
Hence, 
r tB : Prop and TtC : Type. 
By the theorem, B =.+ C. Hence, by the Church-Rosser Theorem, there is a term D 
to which both B and C reduce which can be proved on the basis of r to be in both 
Prop and Type, contradicting Corollary 4.2. 0 
Theorem 7 gives us the following characterization of Z-proposition functions. 
Theorem 10. Zf Z is a well-formed environment, and if A is a I’-proposition function 
which is not a proposition, then either each c-normal form of A has the form 3,x : B . C, 
in which case the type assigned to A by r converts to (Vx : B)F, where F is a context, 
or each c-normal form of A has the form xiw, . . .M,,. 
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Proof. By hypothesis, there is a c-normal deduction of 
l’-kD : (Vx : B)E, 
where A D D, which is a c-normal form of it, and E is a context. Except for (Eq”), 
which makes no difference, the last inference in this c-normal deduction must be (VKi) 
or (Ve). If it is (‘v’rci), we are done. If it is (Ve), then proceed up the let? branch to the 
first formula which is not the conclusion of an inference by (Ve). Since the deduction 
is c-normal and since r is a context, this formula is not the conclusion of an inference 
by (VKi). Hence, it is an assumption, and D has the form xMi . . .A4,, as desired. 
(That all c-normal forms of A are of the same kind follows by the Church-Rosser 
Theorem.) 0 
By iterating the theorem, and, if necessary, replacing terms A4 by lyi : Bi .Mj+, 
where yi is not free in M, we can prove the following corollary: 
Corollary 10.1. Under the hypotheses of the theorem, if 
TtA : (Vxi : B1)...(Vx,, : B,)Prop, 
then either A =* kxl : B1 . . . .1x ,, : B, .A’, where A’ is a r-context, or else every 
c-normal form of A has the form xikl~ . . .A$,. 
3. The strong normalization theorem 
It might appear that to prove the normalization theorem it is sufficient o combine 
Theorem 7 with a similar result for reduction steps whose cut formulas are not propo- 
sitions. But this fails to work, for on the one hand, such a reduction step may require 
that a type of arbitrary complexity be substituted for a variable that is part of an 
assumption, and on the other hand, a reduction step whose cut formula is a proof may 
introduce a new cut formula which is a proposition and whose type is a context of 
arbitrarily high degree. 
On the other hand, Theorem 7 is of help in proving normalization, for it shows (via 
Lemma 3) that the types which are proved to be in Prop can be formed from the 
simple types and Prop by V in much the same way that the types of the second-order 
polymorphic typed &calculus are formed from type variables by the type constructors. 
This turns out to make it possible to adapt a proof of normalization for the second- 
order polymorphic typed I-calculus to TOCO. The proof we have chosen to adapt is 
a version of Girard’s proof [17] of strong normalization, the version being due to 
Stenlund [41, Section 5.61. However, the proof needs to be modified in much the way 
that the proof of [24] is modified in [26]. 
Convention. Let 9 be a deduction whose conclusion is A4 : A, where A =* (Vxl : 
A,)...(tlx, : A,)B, and for i = l,..., n, let 9i be a deduction with conclusion A4i : A(, 
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where 
will denote the deduction 
A4 : (Vx, : ;;A,, . A )B (Eq”) Mf?A, (ve> 
MM1 : [Ml/xl](Vx;~ A;)-(Vx, : A,)B 
%I 
MM* . . . A4,_, : (Vx,, : A;)B’ 
MM, . ..M., : B”, 
Ml : A:, (Ye) 
where B’ s [Ml 1x1,. . . , M,_l/x,_l]B and B” E [M~/x~,...,M,jx,]B. (If n = 0, then it 
will denote 9 itself.) 
Definition 10. If 9 is a deduction whose conclusion is A4 : A, then A is called the 
type of 9. 
Definition 11. A deduction 9 is said to be strongly normal (SN) if every reduction 
starting with 9 terminates in a normal deduction. 
Our aim is to prove that every deduction is SN. 
Remark 7. In the proof, we will be making important use of the classifications in 
Definition 8. We will also be discussing a number of deductions at the same time. It 
will be important that each formula in each deduction be classified the same way in 
any other deduction under consideration. For this purpose we will need to know that 
the well-formed environments of different deductions are all consistent in that none 
of them have assumptions assigning different types to the same variable. To ensure 
this consistency, we will assume that we are starting with a generalized well-formed 
environment TO that is an infinite set rather than a finite sequence of assumptions. All 
well-formed environments actually considered will draw their assumptions from To, and 
no variable will be assigned more than one type in ro. Furthermore, we shall assume 
that any finite subset of lY0 can be extended to a larger finite subset of ro whose 
elements can be ordered in such a way that it is a well-formed environment. For any 
deduction under consideration, we shall assume that its discharged assumptions belong 
to r,; such a deduction will be called &acceptable. A term which is the type of a 
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&acceptable deduction will be called a &-type. We shall assume that any term is 
a &-type which can be built up from Prop, Type, and the simple types and simple 
generalized contexts obtainable from assumptions in rc. (This assumption is easy to 
satisfy; if we start with a candidate for ro for which it is not true, we extend it with 
new assumptions (for new variables), and we keep doing this until there are enough 
assumptions.) A ro-proposition variable of type A, where A is a context, is a variable 
x such that x : A is in &. And finally, a &term of type A is a term M such that 
M : A is provable from assumptions in fe. 
Definition 12. A set S of &acceptable deductions is a grounded type set (ground) if 
the following three conditions are satisfied: 
(a) Every deduction in S is SN; 
(b) If 91(N) is a part of a deduction obtained from a deduction 
x:A 
a(x) 
M:B 
by substituting N for x, if 523 is SN, and if 
93 
N:C 
NA 0%“) 
%tW 
[N/x]M : [N/x]B 
w,. . ., %‘) 
is in S, then 
[x :A] 
a(x) 92 
M:B 
A’K (Vrci- 1) 
2x :A.M: (Vx: A)B 
Lx:A.M:(Vx:C)B 
(Eq”) 
(Ax : A .M)N : [N/x]B 
{a’, . . . > %‘) 
93 
N:C 
(W 
is also in S; and 
(c) If J&,..., 9n are SN, and if 
x:A 
19 I~...,%1 
is a ro-acceptable deduction, then it is in S. 
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A ground in which all of the deductions have a given type A will be called a ground 
of type A. 
Examples. The set of all SN &-acceptable deductions is a ground. This ground will 
be called SN. If A is a ro-type, then the set of all &acceptable deductions of type A 
is a ground of type A; it is called SN(A). 
Definition 13. A proposition term is a term A such that A : B is a proposition. 
A proposition term which is also a variable is a proposition variable. If B =* (Vxl : 
B1 ). . . (ix,, : B,)Prop, then terms Ml,. . .,A4, such that for i = 1,2,. . .,n, A4i : 
[Bh,..., Bi_l/Xi_l]Bi can be proved from hypotheses from TO, will be called argu- 
ment terms of A. If n = 0, then the term [variable] is called a sentence term [sentence 
variable]. (Note that if A is a proposition term and Ml,. . . ,M, are argument terms of 
A, then AM, . . .M,, : Prop can be proved from assumptions in ro.) 
For the next definition, we need to recall what we know about ro-types. We know 
that any such type can be constructed from Prop, Type, and the simple types by the 
universal type-forming operator. The following definition reflects this construction. 
Definition 14. The rank of a &type A, rk(A), is defined as follows: 
(a) if A is a simple type or a simple generalized context, rk(A) = 0; 
(b) rk(Prop) = rk(Type) = 0; 
(c) rk((Vx : A)B) = rk(A) + rk(B) + 1; and 
(d) if A =* B, then rk(A) = rk(B). 
Definition 15. Let M be a ro-term of type A. By induction on rk(A), a computability 
predicate of type M, denoted p[M] is defined as follows: 
(a) if A is not a context, then p[M] s M; 
(b) if A =* Prop or Type, then p[M] is a ground of type M; and 
(c) if A =* (VXI : Al ). . . (Vxk, : A,)Prop, then p[M] is a function whose arguments 
are computability predicates p[Ml], . . . , p[M,] of types Ml,. . . ,M,,, where each Mi is 
a ro-term of type Ai, and whose value is a ground of type MM, . . .M,,. 
For the next definition, we need to proceed by a kind of induction on the structure 
of a term. For this induction, we need to note that if a term A is not a &-proof, then it 
is a ro-proposition function, a ro-context function, or a supercontext. Thus, if A is not 
a ro-proof, then it converts to Prop, Type, a ro-simple type, a ro-simple generalized 
context, (‘dx : B)C (where B is neither a supercontext nor a proof and where C is 
not a proof), or Ix : B . C (where B is neither a supercontext nor a proof and where 
C is neither a supercontext nor a proof). Here B and C are essentially simpler than 
A; furthermore, if A converts to a simple type xM1 . . .M,,, then each Mi is essentially 
simpler than A. This justifies the following definition by induction on the “structure 
of A”. 
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Definition 16. Let A(xt , . . . ,x,) be a term all of whose free variables which are not 
assigned to supercontexts in I’, occur in the list xl,. . .,x,. Let At,. . . ,A,, be I’s-terms 
of the types of x1 , . . . ,x,, respectively. Let p[Al], . . . , p[A,] be an assignment of com- 
putability functions to the terms Al,. . . , A,. Relative to this assignment we shall define 
by induction on the structure of A&, . . .,x,) a computability object 
CL% 3.. ,~dl(p[All,. . ., ~Mnl), 
which will contain deductions of type A(A1,. . .,A,,) if A(xl,. . .,xn) is a &type. To 
simplify the notation, we let x be the sequence XI,. . . ,x,,, A the sequence Al,. . . ,A,,, 
and p[A] be the sequence p[Al], . . . , p[A,]. 
(a) if A(x) is a To-proof, then C[A(x)](p[A]) is the term A(A) itself; 
(b) if A(x) =* Prop, Type, or a ra-simple generalized context, then C[A(x)](p[A]) 
= SN(A(A)); 
(c) if A(n) =* xiMl(X). . .Mm( x an is neither a rs-proof nor a To-simple general- ) d 
ized context, then C[A(x)](p[A]) is 
p[Ail(C[Ml(x)l(p[Al), . . ., WM~)I(PM); 
(d) if A(x) =* (Vx : B(x))C(x,x), where B(x) is not a context, then C[A(x)](p[A]) 
is the set of all rc-acceptable deductions 
9 
A4 : A(A) 
such that if 
9’ 
N : B(A) 
is in C[B(x)](p[A]), then 
N ::(A) (ve) 
is in C[W,x)l(p[4); 
(e) if A(x) =* (Vx : B(x))C( , ) x x w h ere B(x) is a context, then C[A(x)](p[A]) is 
the set of all &acceptable deductions 
9 
M : A(A) 
such that if 
52l 
E : B(A) 
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is in C[B(x)](p[A]) and if p[E] is any computability predicate assigned to E, then 
9 
M : (b&$&+4) (Eq”) 
ME : C(E,A), 
E :?‘;A) (ye) 
(f) if A(x) =* AX : B(x).C(x,x) and is not a rs-proof, then C[A(x)](p[A]) is a 
function whose argument is a computability function of type A, where A is a &term 
of type B(A) (the type of x), and whose values are given by (C[A(x)](p[A]))(p[A]) 
= C[C(x,x)l(P[Al,p[Al)). 
Remark 8. Clause (c) of this definition makes sense only if C[A(~x)l(p[Al) is a com- 
putability predicate. This will be proved below (Lemma 6). 
Remark 9. In clause (d), note that since B(x) is not a context and since N : B(A), 
C(N,x) must have the same structure (with respect to the construction of types) as 
C(x,x). The division into cases between (d) and (e) is precisely the distinction between 
terms which can, after substitution, change the structure of the type in an essential 
way, and dealing with this possible change is one of the main difficulties of the proof. 
Furthermore, in clauses (d) and (e) of this definition, we are assuming that x does not 
occur free in A. Since x does not occur in B(A), this is immediate for those Ai which 
actually occur in B(A), and for those which do not occur in C(X, A), there is clearly no 
problem. For those Ai which occur in C&A) but not in B(A), since we automatically 
change bound variables to avoid clashes when we carry out a substitution, the fact that 
the bound variable is x implies that it does not occur free in these Ai. 
Lemma 4. (a) rf 
x:B 
(91, . . ..%I} 
for n 2 0 is a deduction 
x:B 
{%,...,%} 
is in C[A(x)](p[A]). 
of type A(A), and if 91,. . . ,9,, are all SN, then 
(b) Every deduction in C[A(x)](p[A]) is SN. 
Remark 10. Cf. [18, Theorem A2.3, Lemma 11. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of A(x). Note that A(x) is not a &proof and 
does not convert to Ax : B(x). C(x, x). 
48 J. P. Seldin I Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 83 (1997) 23-101 
Case 1: A(x) =* Prop, Type, or a &simple generalized context. Since 
.X:B 
{%...,W 
is SN whenever 91,. . . , 9, are SN, (a) follows by Definition 16(b). Part (b) follows 
immediately by Definition 16(b). 
Case 2: A(x) =* ~$41 . . . M,,, and is not a &generalized context. Part (a) holds by 
Definition 12(c) and Definitions 15 and 16(b). Part (b) holds by Definition 12(a) and 
Definitions 15 and 16(b). 
Case 3: A(x) =* (Vx : B(x))C(x,x), w h ere B(x) is not a context. To prove (a), let 
9 
M : A(A) 
be a deduction in C[A(x)](p[A]) and let x : B(A) be an assumption in ro for which x 
does not occur free in 9. (We may assume without loss of generality that the bound 
variable x has been changed if necessary to assure that there is such an assumption 
in I’,‘,,) By the induction hypothesis (a) (with n = 0), x : B(A) is in C[B(x)](p[A]). 
Hence, by Definition 16(d), 
M : A(A) 
M : (Vx : B(A))C(x,A) (Eq”) 
Mx : C(x, A) 
x : B(A) (ve) 
is in C[C(x,x)](p[A]). Hence, by the induction hypothesis (b), this deduction is SN. 
Hence, 9 is SN. 
To prove (b), let 
y:E 
(%...,%) 
be a ro-acceptable deduction of type A(A) where 91,. . . , .9,, are all SN, and let 
9 
N : B(A) 
be in C[B(x)](p[A]). By the induction hypothesis (b), 9 is SN. Hence, by the induction 
hypothesis (a), 
(%,.Y.:&q 
is in C[C(N,x)](p[A]). Hence, by Definition 16(d), 
y:E 
{%*..*,%z~ 
is in C[A(x)](p[A]). 
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Case 4: A(x) =* (Vx : B(n))C(x,x), where B(x) is a context. To prove 
9 
M : A(A) 
(a), let 
be in C[A(x)](p[A]), and let x : B(A) be an assumption in I& By the induc- 
tion hypothesis (a) (with n = 0), x : B(A) is in C[B(x)](p[A]). By Defini- 
tion 16(e), 
M : (V: ;$$Z(x, A) (Eq”)
Mx : C(x, A) 
x : B(A) (t/e> 
is in C[W,~)IM~I,PLW f or all p[x]. By the induction hypothesis (b), it is SN. 
Hence, 9 is SN. 
To prove (b), let 
y:E 
{%,...,%I 
be an ro-acceptable deduction of type A(A) where 91,. . . ,9,, are all SN, and let 
9 
F : B(A) 
be in C[B(x)](p[A]). By the induction hypothesis (b), 9 is SN. Hence, by the induction 
hypothesis (a), 
y:E 
(91, . . ..%Z.~} 
is in C[C(x,x)](p[F],p[A]) for all p[F]. Hence, by Definition 16(d), 
y:E 
(9 l,...,%) 
is in C[A(x)](p[A]). 0 
Lemma 5. Zf .9,(N) is a part of a deduction obtained from a deduction 
x:E 
S(x) 
M:B 
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by substituting N for x, if 93 is SN, and if 
N:C 
(6) 
NE (Ed’) 
S(N) 
[N/x]M : [N/x]B 
WI’ ) . . . .9n’} 
is in C[A(x)](p[A]), then 
[x :‘a 
%@I 92 
(7) A,“, bBM . (vxt & cvKi - ‘1 
Ix : E :M : (Vx ; C)B (Eq”) 
93 
N:C 
(Ax : E .M)N : [N/x]B 
(9,’ ) . . ..9”‘} 
We) 
is also in C[A(x)](p[A]). 
Remark 11. Cf. [18, Theorem A2.3 Lemma 21. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of A(x). Again, A(x) is not a J’,‘,-proof and does 
not convert to Ax : B(x). C(x, x). 
Case 1: A(x) =* Prop, Type, or a I&simple generalized context. The lemma 
follows from Definition 16(b) and the fact that (7) is SN whenever (6) is and the 
hypotheses of the lemma are satisfied. 
Case 2: A(x) =* X&II . . .M,,, and is not a rs-simple generalized context. The lemma 
holds by Definition 12(b) and 16(c). 
Case 3: A(x) =* (Vx : B(x))C(x,x), where B(x) is not a context. By hypothesis, 
(6) is in C[A(x)](p[A]). Let 
9 
P : B(A) 
be any deduction in C[B(x)](p[A]). Then by Definition 16(d) we have 
N:C 
E (Ed’) 
SW) 
[N/x]M : [N/x]B 
{W ) . . . .c&‘, 9} 
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is in C[C(P,x)](p[A]). By the induction hypothesis, 
[x :‘a 
91(X) 92 
93 
N:C 
-We) 
is in C[C(P,x)](p[A]). Hence, by Definition 16(d), (7) is in C[A(x)](p[A]). 
Case 4: A(x) =* (Vx : B(x))C(x,x), where B(x) is a context. By hypothesis, (6) is 
in C[A(x)](p[A]). Let 
9 
F : B(A) 
be any deduction in C[B(x)](p[A]), and let p[F] be a computability function for F. 
Then by Definition 16(e) we have 
93 
N:C 
NE (Ed’) 
%W) 
[N/x]M : [N/x]B 
(91’ ). . .2&‘, 9} 
is in C[C(x, x)]( p[F],p[A]). By the induction hypothesis, 
Ax”: ;yM :(yx; Fp w - 1) 
/?x:E.M:(Vx:C)B 
(Ed’) 
(Ax : E .M)N : [N/x]B 
93 
N:C 
PI’ ). . .2&‘, 9) 
is in C[C(x,x)](p[F],p[A]). Hence, by Definition 16(e), (7) is in C[A(x)](p[A]). 0 
Lemma 6. IfA andp[d] satisfy the hypothesis ofDe$nition 16, then Cjjd(x)](p[A]) 
is a ground for each term A(A). 
Proof. Lemmas 4 and 5. 0 
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The following lemma makes sense because of Lemma 6. 
Lemma 7. Let x be a variable which is not assigned a supercontext as a type by r,, 
let A(x,y) be any &type, and let B(y) be a term which can be shown from IYo to 
have the same type as x, where y includes all variables except x which occur free and 
which are not assigned supercontexts as types by ro. Let C be a sequence of terms of 
the same types as the variables in y and let p[C] be an assignment of computability 
predicates to the terms in C. Then 
W(~~Y)~(W(C)~(P[C~)~P[C~) = W(B(Y),Y)I(P[CI). 
Proof. By induction first on the rank of the type of B(y) and second on the structure of 
A(x,y). For simplicity, let p[B(C)] abbreviate C[B(y)](p[C]). (This is a computability 
predicate by Lemma 6.) 
Case 1: A(x,y) is a ro-proof. Then both sides are A(B(C), C) by Definition 16(a). 
In the remaining cases, we may assume that A(x,y) is not a ro-proof. 
Case 2: x does not occur free in A(x,y). Then the lemma is trivial. This takes care 
of the cases in which A(x,y) converts to Prop or Type. 
Case 3: A(x,y) =X .zM, . . .M,,, a simple generalized context. Then z is assigned a 
supercontext as a type by I’,‘, and hence, by hypothesis, is distinct from X. Then by 
Definition 16(b), each side consists of the set of all SN deductions of type A(B(C), C). 
Case 4: A(x, y) =* yMl(x, y) . . .M,(x, y), where y $ x is one of the variables in y, 
and C is the term in C corresponding to y. Then 
= p[CI(C[M(x, y)l(p[B(C)l,~[Cl), . . .v CW&,Y)~(P[B(C)~~P[C~))~ 
and since A(B(y),y) =* YMMY),Y). . .M@(Y),Y), 
= (P[CI)(W~(B(Y),Y)I(P[CI)>. . ., WW(Y),Y)I(P[CI)). 
The lemma follows by the induction hypothesis. 
Case 5: A(x, y) =* xM1 (x, y) . . . M,(x, y). For simplicity, write this as xM(x, y). Then 
the type of x and B(y) is 
(Vz, : E, ) * . . (Vzp : E,)G, 
where G is either Prop or a ro-simple context function, and so B(y) is a proposition 
function. By Definition 16(c), 
‘W(~~Y)I(P[B(C)I,P[CI) = P[B(C)~(WW,Y)~(P~~(C)~~P[CI))~ 
By the induction hypothesis, the right-hand side equals 
P[CI(C[WC9Y)l(P[CI))~ 
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which, by our abbreviation for p[B(C)], is 
C[~(Y)I(p[Cl)(Cr~(B(Y),Y)l(p[Cl)). 
If p = 0, we are finished, since A(B(y),y) =* B(y) and M@(y)) is void, so this is 
just 
aw(Y~~Y~l~Pr~l~~ 
as desired. If p > 0, then we have the following subcases according to Corollary 10.1: 
Subcase 5.1: B(y) =* Azi : El . . . . AZ p : E, . F(z,y), where z is the sequence z], . . . , 
zp. By Definition 16(f), 
C[B(Y)l(p[Cl)(C[~~(Y),Y)l(p[Cl)) 
is 
~~~~Y~zl~~~~l~~~~~~Y~~Y~l~~~~l~~~ 
By the induction hypothesis on the type of B(y), this is 
W(Y VW(y), Y m-J[Cl), 
and since A(B(y),y) =* B(y)M(B(y),y), we are done. 
Subcase 5.2: B(y) =* y;Ni(y). ..N,(y), which we may as well abbreviate as 
yiN(y). Then A(B(y),y) =* yiiV(Y)M(B(y),Y). NOW by Definition 16(c), 
~~~~Y~l~P~~I~~~~~~~Y~,Y~l~P~~I~~ 
is 
P~cil~c~~~Y~l~P~cI~~~c~MB~Y~~Y~l~P~cI~~~ 
but this is the same thing as 
PIGl(CIN(Y )IWCl)2 c[MWY hY )l(P[Cl))7 
and by Definition 16(c), this is 
W(~(Y)~YNP[CI)~ 
as desired. 
Cuse 6: A(x,y) =* (Vz : E(x,y))F(z,x,y), where E&y) is not a context. By the 
induction hypothesis, 
~r~~~~Y>l~Pr~~~~ltPr~l~ = W(~(Y)~YMP[CI) 
and, for any term N(y) such that there is a &acceptable deduction ending in N(C): 
W(C)), 
By Definition 16(d), the lemma follows. 
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Case 7: A(x,y) =* (Vz : E(x,y))F(z,x,y), where E(x,Y) is a context. Similar to 
Case 4 using Definition 16(e). 0 
Notation. In the following lemma, x will denote the sequence xi,. . . ,x,, y the se- 
quence YI, . . . , Ym, N the sequence Ni , . . . ,N,,, B the sequence BI,. . . ,B,, and p[B] 
the sequence p[Bl], . . . , p[B,]. Furthermore, AI,,, for i = 0, 1,. . . ,n - 1, will denote 
[Ni/~i,...,Ni/~ilA+i. 
Lemma 8. Let 
Xl : Al(Y),...,-% :fMy) 
WPY) 
W&Y) : ‘q&Y) 
be a Z&acceptable deduction all of whose undischarged assumptions are among those 
shown, where y consists of all variables which occur free in any type or term which 
are not assigned supercontexts as types by TO. For all assignments of terms B,, . . . , B, 
to Yl,..., y, (where for each i = 1,2,. . . , m, it can be proved from ZO that Bi 
is in the type assigned to yi) and for all assignments of computability predicates 
p[&l,. . . , pR,l to BIT..., B,,,, tffor i = 1,2 ,..., n, the Zo-acceptable deduction 
si 
Ni : A:(B) 
is in C[Ai(y)](p[B]), then 
91 % 
(*) Nl :A;(B),...,N, A;(B) 
JW’, B) 
WN, 4 : A(N, B), 
Remark 12. Cf. [18, Theorem A2.3, Lemma 3(b)]. 
Proof. By induction on structure of g(x,y). 
Basis: 
Case 1: 9(x, y) consists of the axiom (PT). Since this deduction is clearly SN, the 
lemma follows by Definition 16(b). 
Case 2: 9(x, y) consists of the assumption xi : Ai( y). The lemma is immediate. 
Induction step: There are the following cases, according to the last inference in 
%X,Y). 
Case 1: The last inference is by (r&F). By Definition 16(b), it is sulhcient o prove 
that (8) is SN. By the induction hypothesis and Definition 16(b), the deductions of 
both premises are SN. Hence, (8) is SN. 
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Case 2: The last inference is by (Eq’rc). Similar to Case 1. 
Case 3: The last inference is by (Ve). Then M(x,Y) 3 Mt(x,Y)M2(w,Y), A(x,Y)- 
W42(x,Y),x,Y), and Wx,Y) is 
Xl : Al(Y), . f. ,&I : ‘MY) Xl : Al(Y), . *.,&I : 4dY) 
%-%Y) 9"(X,Y) 
M(X,Y) : (‘dx : C(X,Y>)W,X,Y) M2kY) : C(X,Y) (Ye) 
M(-wW2(~,Y) : wf2(x,Y),4Y). 
Subcase 3.1: C(x,y) is not a context. By the induction hypothesis, 
91 sn 
Nl :A’l(B),...,Nn A;(B) 
@(N, B) 
Ml(N, B) : (Vx : C(N, B))E(n,N, B) 
is in C[(Vx : C(N,y))E(x,N,y)l(p[BI) ad 
91 gll 
Nl :A’,(B),...,N, :A#?) 
&‘(N, B) 
MzW,B) : w,m 
is in C[C(N,y)](p[B]). Then by Definition 16(d), (8) is in 
By the induction hypothesis, 
C[E(M2(N,y),N,y)l(p[BI). 
Subcase 3.2: C(x,y) is a context 
91 %I 
Nt : A;(B), . . . , N,, : A;(B) 
@(N, B) 
Ml (N, B) : (Vx : C(N, B))E(x, N, B) 
is in C[(Vx : C(N, y))E(x, N, y)](p[B]) and 
91 grl 
Nl : A;(B), . . . , N,, : A;(B) 
&'(N, B) 
MdN, B) : (N, W, 
is in C[C(N,y)](p[B]). Then by Definition 16(e), for any computability predicate 
p[A&(N, B)], (8) is in C[E(x,N,y)](p[M2(N,B)],p[B]). To complete the proof, it is 
sufficient to find a computability predicate p[M2(N,y)] such that 
(9) C[E(x,N,y)l(p[M2(N,B)l,p[Bl) = C[E(M~(N,Y),N,Y)I(~[BI). 
56 J.P. Seldinl Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 83 (1997) 23-101 
A suitable such function is the one such that 
m42w, WI = w42(~d7)l(P[W 
That this is a computability predicate follows from Definition 15 and Lemma 6. That 
(9) holds follows from Lemma 7. 
Case 4: The last inference is by (Vrci). Then 
A(v) = (Vx : Ct~,Y))Jq&~,y), 
M(x,y) is Ax : C(x,y). Mt(x,x,y), and g(x,y) is 
1 
[x : C(X,Y)lA : Al(Y), * * ’ ,&I : -4(y) x1 :~l(Y),...,xn :40) 
@(x, w) 9”kY) 
MkGY) : 4x,&Y) c(x,Y) ’ lC (Vxi _ 1) 
kc : C(x,y>.M1(x,x,y) : (\Jn : C(~,Y))JqX,X,Y) 
Subcuse 4.1: C(x, y) is not a context. Then K = Prop. By the induction hypothesis, 
for all deductions 
@I 
P : C(N,B) 
9”’ 91 %z 
P : C(N, B),Nl : A;(B), . . . ,A#) 
@(P,N,B) 
Ml (P, N, B) : RP, N, W 
is in C[E(P,N,y)](p[B]). Hence, by Lemmas 4(b) and 5, 
91 [x:lc*],Nl %I 91 %I :AT,...,N, :A: Nl : A;,...,N,, : A,* 
T#* (x) 53 
II* 
M;(x) : E*(x) 
Ix : c* M;(x) : (Vx : 
C*:KtvKi_ 1) LB”’ 
c*),!?*(x) 
A.x : c* .M;c(x)P : E*(P), ’ ’ ‘* (Ve) 
where A: 5 A:(B), X * E X(N, B), and X*(Y) z X(Y, N, B), is also in 
C[E(P,N,y)](p[B]). Since 9”’ is arbitrary, this implies by Definition 16(e) that (8) 
is in WA(N,YMPPI). 
Subcuse 4.2: C(x, y) is a context. Then w E Type. By the induction hypothesis, for 
all deductions 
z-v 
F : C(N,B) 
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in C[C(N,y)](p[B]) and for all computability predicates p[F], 
iv 91 %I 
F : C(N, B),N, : A;(B), . . . ,A#) 
%F, N, B) 
M(F,N,B) : E(F,N,B) 
is in C[E(x,N,y)](p[F],p[B]). Hence, by Lemmas 4(b) and 5, 
[x:lc*],N~ 91 gtl 91 % :AT,...,N, :A,* N, : A:,...,N, : A,* 
9, (x) 9 ,t* 
M;(x) : E*(x) @‘, 
ilx : c* M:(x) : (Vx : 
c* : K (vKi _ 1) 
c*)E*(x) 
lx : C* .M;c(x)F : E*(F), 
F ’ ‘* (Ve) 
where A:, X*, and X*(Y) are as in Subcase 4.1, is also in 
Since $3”’ and p[F] are arbitrary, this implies by Definition 16(d) that (8) is in 
Case 5: The last inference is by (Eq”). This is straightforward by Definition 16. 0 
Theorem 11. Every deduction in TOCO is strongly normal. 
Proof. In Lemma 8, let JZBi consist of the assumption Xi : Ai and let Bj be yj. Then 
for any sequence p[B], g(x,y) is in C[A(x,y)](p[B]), and so is SN. 0 
4. Basic consequences of the strong normalization theorem 
Although we have proved the strong normalization theorem for deductions, this theo- 
rem is usually proved for terms. In [18, Corollary 1521.11 it is shown that for ordinary 
type assignment to i-terms, the normalization theorem for terms can be proved from 
the strong normalization theorem for deductions by using the subject-construction theo- 
rem, which says that a deduction follows the construction of the term to which the type 
is assigned. (Actually, the reference in the proof of [18, Corollary 15.21.11 is to the 
proof of the subject-reduction theorem, but the property of that proof which is actually 
used is the subject-construction theorem.) We do not have this theorem for TOCO in 
a form that is easy to state. Nevertheless, there is a relationship between terms and 
deductions, and we can expect o use this relationship to obtain a normalization theorem 
for terms. 
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Theorem 12. If r is a well-formed environment and if 
TkM:A, 
then M has a normal form. 
Proof. By Theorem 11 there is a normal deduction 9 of 
I-tN:A, 
where M D N. The proof is by induction on the deduction 9. 
Basis: If 9 consists of an assumption, then N is a variable, and so it is in normal 
form. If 9 consists of the axiom (PT), then N is Prop, which is in normal form. 
is 
Induction step: There are the following cases, depending on the last inference in 9. 
Case 1: The last inference is by rule (WC/F). Then A is K’, N is (VX : B)C, and 9 
B:lC 
’ : ” (r&F) 
(Vx : B)C : K’. 
By the induction hypothesis, B and C have normal forms; hence, so does A. 
Case 2: The last inference is by rule (Eq’rc). Then by the induction hypothesis, N 
converts to a term B (to the left of the colon in the premise) which has a normal form. 
Case 3: The last inference is by rule (Ve). Then N E PQ, A E [Q/x]C, and 9 
is 
‘% 972 
P : (Vx : B)C 
PQ : [Q/xlC- 
Q ’ B (Ve) 
By the induction hypothesis, P and Q have normal forms. Furthermore, since 9 is 
normal, there is no Deduction-reduction possible in it. It follows that at the top of 
the left branch of 9 (and hence of 91) is an undischarged assumption. It follows that 
P =* yQl . . . Qm for some variable y. It follows that Qi, . . . , Qm all have normal forms, 
and hence that PQ =* yQl . . . QmQ does as well. 
Case 4: The last inference is by rule (Vrci). Then A E (Vx : B)C, N 5 Ax : B. P, and 
9 is 
fx :B] 
S(x) 92 
P:C B’K (kc- 1) 
Ax :B.P.(Vx: B)C. 
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By the induction hypothesis, B and P have normal forms; hence, so does 
N=Ix:B.P. 
Case 5: The last inference is by rule (Eq”). Then N is the term to the left of the 
colon in the premise, and so by the induction hypothesis it has a normal form. 0 
Note that we have not proved that every term is SN. If we try to replace the 
conclusion by “N is SN” in the above proof, we can see that Case 2 breaks down, 
since not every term convertible to an SN term is itself SN. Indeed, if A is SN, and if 
x @ FV(A), then for any terms B and C, (Lx : B .A)C =* A; now if C has no normal 
form, then (1x : B . A)C is not SN. This shows that we cannot strengthen the theorem to 
prove that N is SN. (Of course, to prove that A4 is SN is somewhat more complicated; 
we will take this up below.) 
It might appear that since only Case 2 breaks down, and since the conclusion in this 
case is not a proof, we might want to add the assumption that N : A is a proof. This 
will exclude Case 2. But now we have trouble with Case 4: we can conclude that P is 
SN, but not that B is SN. Indeed, by the remarks of the previous paragraph, B might 
not be SN. 
Mitchell [30] defines a function Erase for the second order polymorphic typed 
A-calculus which deletes the types of the bound variables. When this function is 
modified for TOCO, it is defined as follows. 
Definition 17. (a) Erase(u) G a if a is a constant or a variable; 
(b) Erase(MN) E Erase(M)Era 
(c) Erase(lx : A . M) z l.x . Erase(M); and 
(d) Erase((Vx : A)B) = (Vx : Erase(A))Erase(B). 
Note that except for clause (d), we are mapping terms of TOCO to pure I-terms. In 
fact, the range of the function Erase is the set of TAG terms [37, Definition 2.181, or, 
equivalently, the set of terms assigned types by TAGi [18, Definition 16.311. 
We can now prove that if A is neither a context nor a supercontext in the theorem, 
then Erase(N) is SN. To extend this result to Erase(M), it is enough to note that 
deductions of proofs do follow the constructions of the terms except that additional 
inferences of formulas which are not proofs are added at various places on top. This 
will give us the following result. 
Corollary 12.1. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 12, if A is neither a context nor 
a supercontext, then Erase(M) is strongly normal. 
There are some further corollaries that follow immediately from Theorem 12. These 
corollaries are standard consequences of normalization theorems. 
Corollary 12.2. For terms M and N such that 
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Tt-N:A, 
where r is a well-formed environment, it is decidable whether or not A4 =* N. 
Corollary 12.3. For a term M and a well-formed environment r, it is decidable 
whether or not there is a term A such that 
I-FM : A. 
We can also relate TOCO to the second-order polymorphic typed I-calculus. Let us 
take the latter in the form of the system TAP of [18, Definition 16.81, except that to 
say that a term M is in type a, I shall continue to write M : ct. Interpret erms of TAP 
as terms of TOCO as follows: first, divide the variables of TOCO into two mutually 
disjoint classes, the first for interpreting term variables of TAP and the second for 
interpreting the type variables. Then, for a term or type A of TAP, we define A*, a 
term of TOCO, as follows: 
(a) if x is a term variable, then x* is a variable of the first class chosen so that if 
x and y are distinct, so are x* and y*; 
(b) if a is a type variable, then a* is a variable of the second class chosen so that 
if a and b are distinct, so are a* and b*; 
(b’) (a + p)* is (VX : @*)/I* for a (term-) variable x which does not occur free in 
tl* or fi*; 
(c) (da. IX)* is (Va* : Prop)a*; 
(d) (MN)* is M*N*; 
(e) (Ma)* is M*cr*; 
(f) (J_x:a.M)* is J_x* : cr*.M*; and 
(g) (Aa.M)* is la* : Prop.M*. 
It is easy to show that if a is any type scheme of TAP, then a* is in normal form, and 
that if M is any term of TAP which is in normal form, then M* is also in normal form. 
Note also that this interpretation takes any /12-contraction f TAP into a /?-contraction 
of TOCO. 
It is easy to show that TAP can be interpreted in TOCO using this mapping; see [ 18, 
Theorem 16.661. (The result is proved for a different system, TAGL, but that system 
is close enough to TOCO that the proof can be easily adapted.) For the converse, we 
have the following theorem. 
Theorem 13. Let r be a sequence 
Xl : Ul,X2 : uz,...,x, : u, 
of assumptions in TAP, and let r* be 
x; : : u;,...,xn* : cd,* 
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Let u be any type scheme in TAP, let al,. . , ,a,,, include all of the type variables 
which occur free in a, and let r’ be 
a; : Prop,. . . ,a: : Prop. 
If 9 is a normal deduction in TOCO of 
where M is a term of TAP, then there is a normal deduction 9’ in TAP of 
rtM:a. 
Remark. Note that this theorem does not say that TOCO is no stronger than TAP. It 
only says that any result of TOCO which consists of translations of TAP formulas could 
have been proved in TAP. Functions that cannot be defined in TAP can be defined in 
TOCO, but to do so requires formulas which are not translations of TAP formulas. 
Proof. Note first that [18, Lemmas 16.67 and 16.681 hold for TOCO as well as for 
TAGL; the proofs for TOCO are obtained by a minor change in notation from those 
for TAGL. 
The proof is by induction on the deduction $3. Note that by hypothesis, !3 does not 
consist of axiom (PT), and its last inference is not by any of rules (r&F) or (Eq’rc). 
Furthermore, the last inference is not by rule (Eq”); for the types of the assumptions 
(both discharged and undischarged) and of the conclusion are all in normal form, and 
if the types of the premises of any rule except (Ve) and (Eq”) are in normal form, 
then so is the type of the conclusion. With regard to inferences in 9 by rule (Ye) the 
left branch above each such inference contains inferences only by the same rule and 
rule (Eq”) and at the top of the branch is an assumption (since 9 is normal); and it 
is not hard to see by beginning with the assumption that because the type of the left 
premise of each such inference by rule (Ve) is b* for some TAP type scheme j3, so is 
the type of the conclusion. It follows that each of these types is in normal form, and 
so there is no inference by rule (Eq”) in the branch. There are the following remaining 
cases: 
Case 1: 9 consists of an assumption. Then M is xi, u is c(i, and 9’ consists of the 
corresponding assumption in TAP. 
Case 2: The last inference in 9 is by rule (Ye). Then since 9 is normal, the only 
inferences which occur in the left branch are by rules (Ve). Furthermore, M* is in 
normal form. Now it follows from this that M* has the form xMi . . . Mp, where x is 
assigned a type by the assumption at the top of the branch (which is not discharged). 
Hence, x is one of the XT. By the definition of the interpretation, it follows that each 
Mj is either N,? for some TAP term Nj, in which case the type assigned to it is $ for 
some TAP type scheme yj, or else some /?T for some TAP type scheme ai, in which 
case the type assigned to it is Prop. By the induction hypothesis, there is a normal 
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deduction 9j of r FNj : yj for each such Nj, and then rules (4 e) and (Ve) of TAP 
can be used to obtain 9’ from the assumption xi : Cli and the deductions 9j. 
Case 3: The last inference in 9 is by rule (VPi). Then LX* is (Vx : B)C and M* 
is Ix : B.N. By the right premise, B is p* for some TAP type scheme p, and it 
follows that x is some y*, for a TAP term variable y, and does not occur free in C; 
furthermore, C is y* for some TAP type scheme y. In addition, N is P* for some 
TAP term P. It follows that if the last inference is removed from 9, the result is a 
normal deduction 91 of 
r*,_y* : p*Jv_p* : y*. 
By the induction hypothesis, there is a normal deduction 91’ of 
r,y:pl-P:y 
in TAP, and 9’ is obtained by an inference by rule (--t i). 
Case 4: The last inference in 9 is by rule (VTi). Then a* is (Vx : B)C and M* is 
Ax : B. N. By the right premise, B is Prop. Hence, x is B* for a TAP type variable a, 
C is /?* for some TAP type scheme /?, and N is P* for some TAP term P. It follows 
that if the last inference is removed from 9, the result is a normal deduction 91 of 
r*,r’,a* : PropEP* : p*. 
By the induction hypothesis, there is a normal deduction 91’ of 
rw:p 
in TAP. Since cx is Au. /I, 9’ follows by an inference by rule (Vi). 0 
Corollary 13.1. Under the hypotheses of the theorem, if N =* M*, if A =+. a*, and 
if 
r*,r’w : A, 
in TOCO, then 
rt-M:a 
in TAP. 
5. Other fomudations of the calculus 
In this section we shall consider an alternative formulation of the theory of con- 
structions. It is a variant of the form in which the theory was originally presented in 
Coquand [5], and is closer to the presentation in other papers by Coquand and Huet 
than is the system TOCO. 
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As we saw in a previous section, every rule which discharges an assumption of the 
form x : A has a premise not depending on this discharged assumption that is either 
A : Prop or A : Type. If we wanted to, we could take these premises as justifications 
for the assumptions instead of premises for the rules; this is the approach adopted by 
Martin-Lijf in his work (see his [27-291). The main reason this is not done in TOCO 
is that it would require that premise to be written above the assumption, and then the 
assumptions would not occur at the tops of branches, an inconvenience for the theory 
of a system such as TOCO. But for the form of the theory of constructions presented 
by Coquand, it is the most useful approach. 
This form of the theory of constructions is what is known as a sequent calculus. 
A sequent is an expression of the form 
where r is a (possibly empty) sequence of formulas and E is a formula. This particular 
sequent calculus is formulated in such a way that the only nonempty sequences that 
can occur to the left of the turnstile (the symbol ‘!-‘) are well-formed environments. 
This will make unnecessary the premises which “justify” the discharged assumptions; 
for these assumptions will all occur to the left of the turnstile in the premises of the 
rules and will hence be part of well-formed environments, and so these premises will 
automatically hold. The fact that r is a well-formed environment will be equivalent to 
the derivability of the sequent 
r k Prop : Type. 
The system will be called TOC2, following [32]. 
Note that until the equivalence of TOCO and TOC2 is proved, it will be necessary to 
specify the system with respect to which an environment is well-formed. Until notice 
to the contrary is given, a well-formed environment will mean with respect to TOC2. 
Definition 18. The system TOC2 is a sequent calculus; its sequents are of the form 
(11) r I- E, 
where r is a sequence of TOCO formulas and E is a TOCO formula. The formulation 
has one axiom, namely 
(PT) k Prop : Type 
(which says that the empty type asssumption is valid). The rules of the system are as 
follows. 
Validity 1. Zf x does not occur free in A or r, 
l-t--A: K 
r,x : A k Prop : Type, 
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Validity 2. If A is a super-context and if x does not occur free in A or r, 
r k Prop : Type 
T,x : A I- Prop : Type, 
Variable. 
T,x : A, 0 I- Prop : Type 
T,x:A,Okn:A, 
Type formation. If x does not occur free in A or rand if A is not a supercontext, 
T,x:At--B:Jc 
rkpk A)B: K, 
Abstraction. If x does not occur free in A or rand if A is not a supercontext, 
r,x:Al-M:B r,x:AkB:K 
TkAx : A.M : (Vx: A)B, 
Application. 
rkM:(vx::)~ rw:A 
r FMiV : [N/x]B, 
Conversion 1. 
l-tM:A A=,B 
rtM:B. 
Conversion 2. 
rkA:K A=,B 
rkB:K 
Remark 13. TOC2 is similar to the presentation of Coquand and Huet [ 111, but differs 
in that it includes Validity 2 and its conversion rules are more general. To get a system 
equivalent to that of Coquand and Huet, it is necessary to delete Conversion 2 and 
Validity 2 and replace Conversion 1 by the rule 
rkM:A A=*B i-k&K 
Tl-M:B. 
For a discussion of the generalization of the conversion rules used here, see [38, 
Remark before Definition 11. The need for Validity 2 results from our inclusion of 
assumptions whose types are supercontexts. 
Remark 14. Pottinger [32] has also proposed replacing rules Validity 1, Validity 2, 
and Variable by the following three structural rules. 
Hypothesis 1. If x does not occur free in A or r, 
rkz‘f:K 
l-,x : A t-x : A, 
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Hypothesis 2. If Tis a well-formed environment, x does not occur free in A or r, and 
if A is a supercontext, 
T,x : At-x : A, 
Reiteration. 
Pottinger calls this formulation TOCl. (These rules are sequent versions of the rules 
fot Hypothesis and Reiteration of Fitch [ 161.) It is not difficult to prove that a sequent 
r I-E is provable in TOCl if and only if it is provable in TOC2 [32]. Note that in 
[32], both TOCl and TOC2 have the more restricted conversion rules of Coquand and 
Huet, but the extension of his equivalence result to the versions given here poses no 
problem. 
Remark 15. Pottinger’s formulation of the rule Abstraction differs from that given here 
in that instead of the second premise he adds the proviso that B not convert to Type. 
It turns out that the proviso is equivalent to the second premise given here (which also 
appears in [7]). 
We shall now establish the equivalence of TOC2 and TOCO. For this proof, FO 
will mean provable in TOCO and I-* will mean provable in TOC2. We need some 
lemmas. 
Lemma 9. If r k2 E for any formula E, and if r’ is any initial segment of r 
(possibly including r itself), then each derivation of r k2 E contains a subderivation 
of r’ k2 Prop : Type. 
Proof. By induction on the derivation of r k2 E. 
Basis: If r k2 E is the axiom (PT), then r’ is empty, and the result is trivial. 
Znduction step: We assume the property for each premise of a rule and prove it for 
the conclusion. 
If the sequence to the left of t- in the conclusion is an initial segment of that of at 
least one premise, this is trivial. This takes care of all rules except the validity rules. 
In these cases, r is rl, A: Prop, and E is Prop:Type. If r’ is all of r, then the 
entire deduction is what we seek. Otherwise, r’ is an initial segment of r,, and the 
result is trivial by the induction hypothesis. 0 
Lemma 10. Zf r l-2 Prop : Type, then r is a well-formed environment. 
Proof. By induction on the pair (n,m), where n is the number of formulas in r and 
m is the length of the derivation of r Et Prop : Type. 
Basis: Trivial, since r is empty. 
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Induction step: Assume the lemma for any initial subsequence of r, and suppose 
that r is T/,x : A. By the induction hypothesis, r’ is a well-formed environment. Now 
the only rules of which 
T’,x : A t-2 Prop : Type 
can be the conclusion are the conversion and validity rules. If the rule is a conversion 
rule, then by Lemma 9 there is a subderivation of the derivation of the premise of the 
inference which is a derivation of 
T’,x : A F2 Prop : Type 
and so the conclusion follows by the induction hypothesis; if the rule is a validity 
rule, then it follows that x does not occur free in r’ or in A and that if A is not a 
supercontext then 
r’ k.2 A : K. 
Since r’ is a well-formed environment, his implies that r is as well. 0 
Lemma 11. If r k2 E, then r is a well-formed environment. 
Proof. Lemmas 9 and 10. 0 
Theorem 14. There is a formula E such that r F’z E if and only if r is a well- 
formed environment. 
Proof. The “only if” part is Lemma 11. The “if” part is easy using the axiom and 
rules Validity. 
We are now in a position to prove the equivalence between TOCO and TOC2. 
Theorem 15. If 
(13) r h) E. 
Proof. By induction on the derivation of (12). 
Basis: (12) is (PT) in TOC2. Then r is empty, E is Prop: Type, and (13) holds 
by axiom (PT) in TOCO. 
Induction step: The cases are by the last rule used in the derivation of (12). 
Case Validity 1. Trivial. 
Case Validity 2. Trivial. 
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Case Type formation. E is (Vx : A)B : K, where n does not occur free in A or r, 
and the premise is 
T,x: A k2 B: K. 
By the induction hypothesis, 
r,x : A t-0 B : K. 
Furthermore, by Theorem 14, r, x : A is a well-formed enviroment (with respect to 
TOC2), and A is not a supercontext. This means that the derivation of (12) includes 
a subderivation of 
r t-2 A : K'. 
Hence, again by the induction hypothesis, 
r to A : K'. 
Hence, (13) follows by (K'KF). 
Case Variable. Trivial by the conventions of natural deduction systems. 
Case Abstraction. Similar to Case Type formation, using (Vrci). 
Case Application. E is MN : [N/x]B, and the premises are 
r k2 M : C and r I-* N : A, 
where C =* (‘dx : A)B. By the induction hypothesis 
r t-s M : C and r t-,, N : A. 
(13) then follows by rules (Eq”) and (Ve). 
Case Conversion 1. Trivial by rule (Eq”). 
Case Conversion 2. Trivial by rule (Eq’rc). Cl 
For the converse we have: 
Theorem 16. Zf r is a well-formed environment, and if (13) holds, then (12) holds. 
Proof. By induction on the sum of the length (number of formulas in) of the proof 
of (13) plus the subsidiary proofs that show that ris a well-formed environment. We 
have the following cases: 
Case (PT): If (13) is (PT) in TOCO, then (12) follows by (PT) in TOC2. 
Case Assumption. If (13) consists only of the assumption x : A, then r consists 
only of x : A. Since r is a well-formed environment, A is a supercontext or kc A : K. 
If A is a supercontext, we have (12) as follows: 
h Prop : Type Validity 2 
x : A t-2 Prop : Type Variable 
x:A byx:A. 
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If l-s A : K, then by the induction hypothesis, 12 A : K, and we get (12) by Validity 
1 and Variable. 
The remaining cases are by the last rule in the deduction of (13). 
Case (J&F). (13) is 
r t-0 ((Vx : A))B : K’, 
where x does not occur free in A or in r. The premises are 
r kc A : IC and T,x : A FO B : K’. 
Hence, f,x : A is a well-formed environment (with respect o TOCO), and so by the 
induction hypothesis 
f,x : A k2 B : K’. 
Hence, (12) follows by Validity. 
Case (Ye): (13) is 
l- k. MN : [N/x]B, 
where the premises are 
r t-oM:(Vx:A)B and r t-0 N:A. 
By the induction hypothesis, 
r k2 M : (Vx : A)B and r k-2 N : A. 
Hence, (12) follows by rule Application. 
Case (Vrci): (13) is 
l- t-o Ix : A.M : (Vx : A)B, 
where the premises are 
l-,x: A k. M : B and r to A : K, 
where x does not occur free in A or in r. It follows that T,x : A is a well-formed 
environment with respect o TOCO, and so by the induction hypothesis, 
T,x:A k2 M:B. 
Hence, (12) follows by rule Abstraction. 
Cases (Eq”) and (Eq’rc): Trivial by the corresponding rules in TOC2. 0 
Theorem 17. A necessary and sz&icient condition that (12) hold is that r be a well- 
formed environment (with respect to TOCO) and that (13) hold 
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Proof. Theorems 15 and 16. Cl 
Corollary 17.1. An environment r is well-formed with respect to TOCO if and only 
if it is well-formed with respect to TOC2. 
For this reason, we shall no longer specify the system with respect to which an 
environment is well-formed. 
6. Representing logic with equality 
We now turn to a representation of logic with equality. The definitions are all stan- 
dard for second- and higher-order logic, but since they will be used extensively in the 
rest of the paper it is worth giving them here for definiteness. 
Definition 19. The term F is defined as follows: 
F~3,u : Prop.Au : Prop.(Vx : u)v. 
We use either A -+ B or A > B as an abbreviation for FAB, depending on the context. 
In particular, we often use A > B when both A and B are in Prop. 
It is easy to show that + satisfies the rules (-+ e) 
M:A+B N:A 
MN:B 
and (- i) 
[x : A] [I M:B A:K 
Lx:A.M:AAB. 
This means, of course, that > satisfies rules (3 e) 
M:A>B N:A 
MN:B 
and (Ii) 
[x:A] 
M:B A:Prop 
3,x: A.M: A>B. 
Definition 20. The conjunction proposition operator and its associated pairing and 
projection operators are defined as follows: 
(a) A E Au : Prop. Au : Prop. (VW : Prop)((u -+ v -+ w) --) IV); 
(b) DE~U:Prop.~v:Prop.~x:u.~y:v.~w:Prop.Rz:u-,v-,w.zxy; 
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(c) fst 3 J.u : Prop, Iv : Prop. Ix : Auv .xu(iy : u. AZ : v. y); and 
(d) snd-lu:Prop.Au:Prop.Lx:Auv.xv(Ly:u.2z:v.z). 
We use A A B and A x B as abbreviations for AAB. 
It is not at all difficult to prove from these definitions that if A : Prop and B : Prop 
DAB:A+B+AAB, 
fstAB : A A B -+ A, 
and 
sndAB:AAB--+B. 
Furthermore, it is easy to see that if A4 : A and N : B, then 
fstAB( DABMN) =* M 
and 
sndAB(DABMN) =* N. 
Definition 21. The disjunction proposition operator and its associated injection and 
case operators are defined as follows: 
(a) V E lu : Prop. Au : Prop. (VW : Prop)((u + w) --$ ((0 -+ w) -+ w)); 
(b) inl=IZu:Prop.Lu:Prop.ilx:u.Lw : Prop.If:u+w.2g:v-+w.fx; 
(c) inr~lu:Prop.~v:Prop.~y:v.;lw:Prop.~f:u~w.~g:u~w.gy; and 
(d) case-lu:Prop.;lv:Prop.Az:Vuu.J.w:Prop.Lf:u-+w.Jg:u+ 
w .zwfg. 
We use A V B as an abbreviation for VAB. 
It is easy to show that if A : Prop and B : Prop, then 
inlAB:A+AVB, 
inrAB: B-+AVB, 
and 
caseAB : A V B --f (VW : Prop)((A --t W) + ((B -t W) + w)). 
Furthermore, it is easy to show that if C : Prop, M : A, N : B, F : A + C, and 
G : B + C, then 
caseAB(inlABM)CFG =* FM 
and 
caseAB(inrABN)CFG =* GN. 
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Definition 22. void z I E (Vx : Prop)x. 
We shall use I when we are thinking of the proposition and void when we are 
thinking of the type (which is supposed to be empty). 
Definition 23. The existential quanti’er proposition operator and its associated pairing 
and projection functions are defined as follows: 
(a) C E Au : Prop. Au : u -+ Prop. (VW : Prop)((Vx : U)(DX + w) + w); 
(b) D’~~u:Prop.~u:u~Prop.~x:u.3~y:ux.~w:Prop.~z:(Vx::)(ux-tw) 
. zxy; and 
(c)proj~lu:Prop.~u:u~Prop.lw:Prop.lz:(Vx::)(ux-,w).~y:(Vx::) 
ux ywz. 
We use (3~ : A)B as an abbreviation for 24(2x : A . B). 
It is not hard to show that if A : Prop and B : A --) Prop, then 
(3~ : A)B : Prop, 
D’AB : (Vu : A)(Bu 1(3x : A)(Bx)), 
and 
projAB : (Vx : A)((V’u : A)(Vu : Bu)x 1(3w : A)(Bw) IX). 
Furthermore, if in addition C : Prop, A4 : A, N : BM, and 
2 : (Vu : A)(Bu -+ C), 
then 
projABCZ(D’ABMN) =* ZMN. 
Note that D’ differs from D only in the types postulated for some of the bound 
variables. But this difference is enough to make it impossible to define a right projection 
for D’ that is correctly typed: on this point, see [4]. Of course, a modified version of 
fst works as a left projection function for D’: 
fst’ = AU : Pr0p.h : u-+ Prop.lx : Zuu.xu(A.y : u.Az : u. y). 
We can also define equality over any type: 
Definition 24. The equality proposition 
where A is assigned type Prop, is defined to be 
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where 
It is not hard to show that 
A:Prop,X:At-ilz:A+Prop.l~:zX.u:X=~X 
and 
A : PropJ : A, Y : A,M : X =A Y,Z : A --) Prop,N : ZX kA4.N : ZY. 
This gives us the reflexive law of the equality proposition and the substitution prop- 
erty; these two properties are well known to imply all the usual properties of equality. 
It is not hard to see from this that we have all the usual properties of constructive 
predicate logic with equality. 
We can also interpret classical ogic. One interpretation (see [9, Section 3.31, where 
this is done for propositional logic) is based on the following easily proved facts about 
intuitionistic logic: 
k ~~74 174, 
74(X) > A(x) k +vX)A(x) >(Vx)A(x). 
Results corresponding to these can easily be proved in the theory of constructions. This 
means that for formulas A which are classical, that is for which l-~1_4 > A, the logic 
is classical. Furthermore, all negative formulas are classical and both A and V preserve 
classical formulas. For other classical connectives and the existential quantifier, we can 
use their familiar classical properties to define them: 
A>,Br+4A1B), 
A V, B = T(TA A TB), 
and 
(3, x : A)B E ~(VX : A)TB. 
Since these are all negative formulas, they are all classical. 
It is not hard to prove that if A is classical (in a well-formed environment r), then 
there is a term A4 all of whose free variables are assigned types in r such that 
If this method of representing classical ogic is used in any “applied” theory, then 
it is necessary to be certain that 
-7E>E 
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is provable for each formula E corresponding to an atomic formula in ordinary first- 
order logic. To assure this, it may well be necessary to take these formulas as new 
assumptions. 
A second method of interpreting classical ogic is as follows: define 
Boo1 zz (Vu : Prop)(u --) u --) u), 
Tr=Lu: Prop.lx: u.1~: u.x, 
and 
Fzlu : Prop.lx: u.Ay : u.y. 
Here, BOOI represents he boolean type familiar from the usual programming languages, 
and T and F for the familiar truth values. The familiar if . . . then . . . else op- 
erator is defined as follows: 
It is easy to prove that T : Boo1 and F : Bool and, if A is any type in Prop and M : A 
and N : A, then 
CondATMN =* M 
and 
CondAFMN =* N. 
The propositional connectives familiar to most programmers can now be defined: 
lk E 1~ : Bool. Cond Bool x F T, 
Ak = lx : Bool. -@- Bool F, 
and 
vk = Ax : Bool .x Bool T. 
It is then easy to prove the following: 
7k-r =* F -kF =* T 
,,km =* T A,TF =* F 
nkFT =* F AkFF =* F 
vkn =* T VkTF =* T 
VkFT=*T V/$F =* F 
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We can then get implication as usual by defining 
>k = AX : Boot, ly : Bool. +X f,k TkY), 
and its usual truth table properties will follow. 
In this formulation of classical ogic, a proof of a proposition A is not a term with 
that proposition as its type, but rather a term with the type A =noOt T. Thus, unlike 
the first interpretation of constructive logic, this interpretation is based on a different 
set of terms to represent he propositions. In fact, it is based on the idea, originally 
due to Frege, that there are only two propositions, T and F. 
Extending this second interpretation to quantifier logic is a bit complicated. The 
obvious way to proceed is to assume that we have a propositional function A over 
some domain D, which is a type. In this case, this means that A : D + BOOI. We 
would want (v&X : D)(h) to be T if and only if AM is T for every A4 : D and to be 
F otherwise; but this specification assumes classical ogic, whereas the type 
(Vx : D)(Ax =Boo~ T) 
is treated constructively by TOCO, and in general there is no term with the type 
(vx : D)(Ax =&,ol T) V (dx : D)(Ax =&,oj F). 
One possible solution is to use the first interpretation of classical ogic, and replace 3 
by 3,. But this will only work if D is a type for which there is a term of type 
(vx : D)(-Ax =&,ol T > Ax =&,,I T). 
A third possible method of interpreting classical ogic is to add a new axiom by 
assigning to an atomic constant of the type 
(VU : Prop)(w V u) 
or the type 
(Vu : Prop)(-24 3 24). 
We will have more to say about this in Section 9. 
7. Adding logical and mathematical assumptions 
As we have seen, when logic is represented in the theory of constructions, the 
formulas are all represented by types in Prop; the terms in these types will represent 
proofs. One consequence of this is that assuming a new axiom A will mean taking a 
new atomic constant c and adding c : A as a new assumption to the environment. 
Now the way we have proved the strong normalization theorem in Section 3 guaran- 
tees that such constants can be added without interfering with the proof of the theorem 
provided that these new constants do not occur at the heads of new redexes. But this 
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is just the way new axioms are added. Thus, adding new axioms does not have any 
effect on the strong normalization theorem. 
But adding new axioms may well affect the consistency of the system. Suppose, for 
example, we assume c : 1. This amounts to assuming as an axiom I, i.e., to assuming 
the inconsistency of the system. Another such set of assumptions is the following: 
cl : Prop,c* : cI,c3 : 7c1. 
The strong normalization theorem does, however, imply the consistency of the empty 
environment, and thus of the system TOCO itself. 
Theorem 18. There is no term M such that 
Proof. Let 9 be a normalized deduction with no undischarged assumptions of 
Then for any new variable x, the following is a valid deduction: 
9 
M:l x : Prwcvej 
Mx:x. 
This deduction can be normalized without changing the conclusion or any undischarged 
assumptions. Since the type of the conclusion of this normalized deduction has com- 
plexity 0 and since the deduction is normal, there can be no inference in the main 
branch of the deduction by (kc i). This means that the formula at the top of the main 
branch is an undischarged assumption, contradicting the assumption about 9. Cl 
Note that this proves the consistency of the higher-order constructive logic of the 
previous section. 
If this system is to be used as the basis of a proof development system that is to 
be of practical use in situations in which we need confidence in the validity of the 
proofs obtained, we will need to make assumptions and, at the same time, we will 
need confidence that the assumptions do not allow us to deduce that there is a term 
in 1. Assumptions satisfying this condition are important enough that they deserve a 
definition. 
Definition 25. A valid set r of assumptions is said to be consistent if there is no term 
M such that there is a proof in TOCO of 
Then another way to state Theorem 18 is that the empty set of assumptions is consistent. 
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Any application of a theorem-prover built on TOC will involve assumptions in order 
to represent notions from logic, mathematics, or computer science. In order to have 
sufficient confidence in the soundness of the proofs constructed with its aid, it is 
necessary to have some confidence that the sets of assumptions involved are consistent 
in this sense. 
The proof of Theorem 18 shows that proving that there is no term M such that 
r F-M : J- is equivalent to proving that there is no term N such that T,x : Prop t-N : x. 
As an example of a deduction which can lead to this kind of conclusion, suppose 
that x : Prop, A : Prop, N : A, and M : (Vz : A + Prop)(zN). Then we have 
x : Prop 
A4 : (VZ : A -+ Prop)(zN) 
A : Prop (vpi _ 
ly : A .x : A + Prop cve) 
~(b”~-&(~ ; ,” .x)N (Eq”) 
. . 
v) 
This is an example of the kind of deduction that must be prevented, and to prevent it 
we need to exclude such assumptions as 
M : (Vz : A + Prop)(zN). 
Now if there is a deduction of T,x : PropkN : x, then there is a normalized 
deduction of it, the left branch consists of major premises for (Ve) and (Eq”), and the 
assumption at the top of the branch is not discharged. The following definition gives 
a set of conditions on assumptions which make it impossible for any one of them to 
occur at the top of the left branch of such a normal deduction. 
To state the definition, recall that each type converts to the form 
(Vx, : Al)(Vxz : A2)...(Vxn : A,)$ 
where S is a simple type. Let us call n the index of the type and S its tail. Then in 
the above example that we need to exclude, the variable at the head of ZN (the tail of 
the type of M) has a type whose tail is Prop. This seems to be the key property of 
the assumptions that need to be excluded. 
Definition 26. Let r be a well-formed environment of the form 
x1 : A,,x2 : A2 ,..., x,, : A,. 
For each i, let Ai convert to 
(V’yil : Bil )(VYi2 : Bi2). . . (V.Yirna : Bim, Pi, 
where Si is the tail of Ai. Then r is strongly consistent if for each Ai for which 
m; > 0 and & converts to the form ZiMiiMi2 . . . Mil, if zi is a variable (and hence one 
of the Xj or yjk), then the tail of its type does not convert to Prop. 
It follows immediately from the definition that any strongly consistent environment 
is consistent. 
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Note how weak this definition is. No type in a strongly consistent environment can 
have any of the following forms: A A B, A V B, (3x : A)B, I, 1A, or M =A N. 
Although a negative formula cannot occur in a strongly consistent environment, 
there are well-formed environments involving negative formulas which can be proved 
consistent: 
Definition 27. Let TO be a strongly consistent environment. Let ri consist of assump- 
tions of the form u : TB, where, under the assumptions of TO, B is a small simple 
type (i.e., a simple type that is in Prop under the right assumptions) but B does not 
convert to the type of an assumption i  TO. Let Tz consist of assumptions of the form 
V : TTB, where, under the assumptions of TO, B is a small simple type and where 
1B does not convert to the type of an assumption in rr (but B may convert to the 
type of an assumption i  To). If r is ro,ri,rZ, then r is said to be strongly negation 
consistent. 
Theorem 19. A strongly negation consistent environment is consistent. 
Remark. Clearly, if B converts to C, then u : TB, v : C I- uv :1. What this theorem says 
is that if B is a small simple type, this is essentially the only way to get a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 19. Suppose r is strongly negation consistent and suppose that for 
some term M 
then for a variable w which is not free in r, we have for some term M’ 
r, w : Prop FM’ : W. 
Normalize this deduction and let the result be 9. Suppose that there is no proper 
subdeduction of 9 which proves either 
r’t-M” :I or r’,w : Propt-M” : w 
for any other strongly negation consistent r’; otherwise we can begin with this proper 
subdeduction. (Here proper subdeduction means that there is more difference than 
the one inference necessary to go back and forth between a conclusion whose type 
is I and one whose type is w.) Now the last inference in $9 which differs from 
(Eq”) cannot be (Vrci); thus it must be (t/e). It follows that the left branch of 9 
consists of inferences by (Ve) and (Eq”), and hence the top of the left branch 
is not discharged. This assumption at the top of the left branch must be in ri 
or r,. 
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Case 1: It is in ri. Then it is u : TB for a small simple type B not convertible to a 
type in TO or I”, and 9 is 
w : Promu : 1B 
u : -JB M” : B 
uM" : _L 
(Qe'e> 
92 
M’ : w. 
Now clearly no assumption of 91 is discharged in 92. Hence, since B is a simple 
type, the top of the left branch of 91 must be in fi or r2. Hence, 91 is 
w : Prop,u : ~B,u’ : 7B’ 
93 
u’ : 1B’ M”’ : B’ 
u/M”’ : I (Qe) 
94 
M” : B, 
where B’ is simple or the negation of a simple type. But then 
w : Prop,u : 7B,u’ : -B’ 
93 
u .7B’ 
’ . M”’ : B’ 
u’M”’ : I (Qe> 
is a proper subdeduction of 9 contradicting the assumption about 53. Hence, the top 
of the left branch of .9 is not in ri. 
Case 2: It is in T2. Then it is 24 : TYB, where B is a small simple type, and 9 is 
w : Prop,u : TB 
. , 
91 
u : 77B M” : -B cQeJ 
uM” : I 
92 
M’ : w. 
The argument of Case 1 shows that the last inference in 9, which differs from (Eq”) 
is not (Qe), so it must be by (QPi), and 91 is 
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1 
w : Prop, u : l,B, [u : B] 
93 94 
M”’ : I B ’ Prop (vpi _ 1) 
Iv : B.M”’ : -B, 
where M” converts to Iv : B .M”‘. But then 9s is a proper subdeduction of 9 con- 
tradicting our assumption. Hence, the assumption at the top of the left branch of 23 is 
not in r,. 
This shows that r is consistent. 0 
In the rest of the paper, we will look at some assumptions that cannot occur in 
strongly consistent or strongly negation consistent environments. 
8. Negations of equations 
There are environments involving negation other than strongly negation consistent 
environments hat can be proved consistent. Thus, suppose r is 
Xl : -Al,x, : 7A2,. . . ,x, : -A,, 
where 1A is defined to be A > 1. It is possible to show that r is consistent by showing 
that there is no term M for which 
for any i. As an example, we can prove that negations of equations between terms 
with distinct normal forms are consistent if all the other assumptions are in a strongly 
consistent environment. 
Theorem 20. Let I’, be a 
(distinct) constant a type 
Q of type A with distinct 
environment. Suppose that 
r,,r,k-R : M =B N. 
Then 
M=,N. 
set of assumptions in which each formula assigns to a 
which converts to the form 7P =A Q for terms P and 
normal forms, Suppose that P2 is a strongly consistent 
there is a closed term R such that 
Proof. Let 9 be a deduction in normal form of 
r,,r2b--R : M =B N. 
We proceed by induction on the structure of $23. Thus, we may suppose as part of the 
induction hypothesis that the theorem holds for any proper subdeduction of 9 whose 
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undischarged assumptions satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem. Suppose that the last 
inference in 9 (except for equality rules) is by (Ve). Because 9 is normal, the only 
inferences in the left branch of 9 are (Ve) and (Eq”). Consider the formula at the 
top of the left branch of 9. Because of the form of 9 and of the rules of TOCO, this 
formula is not a discharged assumption. It must thus have the form x : C, where 
c =* (V’yl : Cl)(VJ9 : C2). . . (VY& : Ck)(M =B N). 
By Definition 26, a type of this form cannot occur in a strongly consistent environment; 
hence it is in ri, and C =* TP =A Q. It follows that the deduction of the minor (right) 
premise for the inference by (Ve) of which the formula in question is the major (left) 
premise is a proper subdeduction of G.3 whose conclusion has the form S : P =A Q 
for a closed term S and terms P and Q with distinct normal forms, contradicting the 
assumption that the theorem holds for any proper subdeduction of 9. Hence, the last 
non-equality inference in 9 is not by (Ve). 
Since 
A4 =B N =* (Vz : B + Prop)(zM 3 zN), 
it follows that the last non-equality inference is by (VTi), 
R=l.z: B+ Prop.P, 
and 9 has the form (possibly modulo some manipulations involving rules (Eq’P), 
(Eq’T), and (Eq”); we will not bother to mention this fact again in what follows) 
[Z : B f Prop] 
%(z) B : Prop 
P:zM>zN 
Prop : Type (PTF _ v) 
B + Prop : Type 
h : B + Prop. P : (Vz : B + Prop)(zM 3 zN), 
(VTi - 1) 
where z is a variable which does not occur free in ri, I”, M, or N. Since z : A -+ Prop 
cannot occur in a strongly consistent environment, an argument similar to the above 
argument for 9 shows that the last non-eq inference in 91(z) is not by (Ve). Hence, 
the last non-eq inference in 91(z) is by rule (VPi), P =* hv : ZM . Q, and 91(z) has 
the form 
1 
[W : zM] 
92(w) z : B --) Prop 
Q:zN 
M’B(4e) 
ZM : Prop (t/pi _ 2) 
;Iw:zM.Q:zM>zN, 
where w is a variable distinct from z which does not occur free in ri, G, M, or N. 
By an argument similar to that above, the last inference in 92(w) is not by rule (Ve). 
Furthermore, any deduction of Q : ZN must use the hypothesis w : zM. Since 92(w) 
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is normal and zM and ZN are simple types, it is not hard to see that the only rule that 
can occur in $22(w) is (Eq”), from which it follows that Q G w and, more important, 
M=,N. 0 
Corollary 20.1. If rl,I” is as in the theorem, then it is consistent. 
In case Pi is empty, we have the following additional consequence of the theorem. 
Corollary 20.2. If r is a strongly consistent environment, and if there is a closed 
term R such that 
This theorem can be generalized somewhat. For example, if the types of the variables 
are suitably restricted to prevent substitution i stances of P and Q which are convertible 
to each other, it is presumably possible to prove a version of the theorem for universally 
quantified inequalities or for implications whose consequents are inequalities. 
9. Arithmetic 
Arithmetic is interpreted as in the second-order polymorphic typed I-calculus. When 
modified for TOCO, this is as follows: 
Definition 28. (a) N 5 (VA : Prop)((A -+ A) -+ (A + A)); 
(b) OEM : Prop.Lx :A -+A.Ay :A.y; 
(c) a-,lu:N.M : Prop.lx:A+A. ;ly:A.x(uAxy); 
(d) n-;lu:N.snd N N(u(N x N)Q(D N NOO)), where QEAv:N x N. D N N(a 
(fstNNv))(fst N Nu); and 
(e)R SAA : Prop.Ix:A.ly:N+A-+A. lz:N.z(N+A)P(lw:N.x)z,where 
P s Av : N + A. ,iw : N . y(xw)(v(nw)). 
The term n, which represents the natural number n, is defined to be 
a(a(. . . (CO). . .)). 
n 
It is not hard to show that 
0 : N, 
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and 
R:(VA:Prop)(A-+(N-+A-+A)-+N+A). 
It is also easy to show that 
n=,U : Prop.Ix:A+A.ly:A.x(x(...(xy)...)), 
n 
a0 =* 0, 
7c(un) =* n, 
and also, for any type A : Prop and any terms M and N of types A and N + A + A, 
respectively, 
RAMNO =* M, 
and 
FWbfN(an) =* Nn(R4MVn). 
It is also not hard to show that 
N : Prop. 
We know that this definition works in the sense that we can define all primitive 
recursive functions and that the peano axioms hold. However, our knowledge of the 
peano axioms is entirely metatheoretic; we do not get the formulas representing these 
axioms as theorems of TOCO. To get the peano axioms holding formally within TOCO, 
we need to add some new axioms. The first two axioms we need are obvious: 
Peanol =(b’n : N)(lan =N 0) 
and 
Peano2z(vm :N)(Vil:N)(om=N on 3 m=N n) 
We also need the induction axiom: 
Peano E (V,4 : N -+ Prop)((Vm : N)(Am > A(am)) >A0 >(VJ~ : N)(h)). 
Since the defining equations for + and x follow from the reduction properties of R 
and rule (Eq”), it may appear that we have everything we need for arithmetic. 
However, we are not finished. For although the only closed terms of type N are 
known to be natural numbers (except for 1A : Prop. Ix : A + A .x, a term q-convertible 
but not /&convertible to 1; however, this term is not really something other than a 
natural number), so that the axiom Peano does not really restrict the domain of 
objects in N, we do need to be able to talk about objects in other types which are 
not natural numbers. We may even want to create a supertype of N, and in such a 
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supertype, where we will have things which are not natural numbers, we will want to 
be able to assert that an object is not a natural number. To do this, we need to be able 
to say that something is a natural number. And so far, we have no way of doing this 
that is part of the logic; we have only 
M : N. 
which is definitely not the same thing. Thus, we need a predicate of the logic, JV, 
which says that something is a natural number. The definition we want is as follows: 
Jf E An : N . (VA : N + Prop)((Vm : N)(Am > A(am)) > A0 I An). 
It is easy to prove 
I- Jf : N -+ Prop, 
tM:NO, 
t N : (b : N)(,lm > .&“(an)), 
for some closed terms M and N. 
Now that we have the definition of JV, we no longer need the axiom Peano, for it 
is easy to prove (this is not mentioned in [20] or [21]) that there is a closed term M 
such that 
t--M : (VA : N + Prop)((Vm : N)(Am > A(am)) >A0 >(Vn : N)(Jlm > An)). 
While this is not exactly Peano, it is close enough for practical purposes. What Peano 
actually does is to say that the induction principle holds formally for the type N. We 
know metatheoretically that it holds for N, but without the axiom Peano, we do not 
have the result as a formal theorem of TOCO. Since we do have that formal knowledge 
about J1/^, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which this formal knowledge about 
N would be necessary. 
This leaves us with the axioms Peanol and Peano2. These two axioms appear to 
constitute a minor variation of the well-formed environment r of Theorem 20. This fact 
was used in [37, Theorem 5.31 to prove the consistency of cl : Peanol,c2 : PeanoP. 
However, it has since turned out that Peano can be replaced by a provable result. 
Lemma 12. For some term M, 
FM : (Vn : N)(Mn --+ n(an) =N n). 
Remark 16. This is proved as in [39, Lemmas 4.1-4.21. 
Proof of Lemma 12. A direct calculation gives that z(a(an)) =* a(n(an)). Hence, 
there is a term MI such that 
n : N,x : rr(bn)=N n tMt : n(a(an))=N bn. 
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Hence, by (t/Pi), there is a term A42 such that 
tA42 : (Vn : N)(x(an)=N n + x(u(un))=N an). 
This is the induction step. The basis is easy, since n0 =* 0. Then induction (which 
follows from the definition of N) gives us the lemma. 0 
Lemma 13. For some term M, 
I-M : (h : N)(Vn : N)(_.Vn + _&‘-in + bn =N urn --f n =N m). 
Proof. We can easily formalize in this logic the following argument, where n = m 
represents n=N m: un = urn, therefore n(an) = z(um), and so n = m. 0 
Thus, arithmetic can be interpreted with only one assumption: c : Peanol. ([38, 
Footnote 2, p. 4371 is in error; the proof given by Coquand there is for another system 
and is invalid in TOCO.) This is a minor variation on the environment r of Theorem 20: 
Theorem 21. Zf r be a strongly consistent environment, hen T,c : Peanol is con- 
sistent. 
Proof. This will be proved by showing that it is impossible to have a deduction of 
(14) T,c : Peanol,z : PropkM : 2, 
where z does not occur free in r. Thus, suppose that 9 is a normalized deduction 
of (14), and suppose without loss of generality that it is the shortest possible such 
deduction. Then the last rule (aside from (Eq”)) must be (Ve). Then the formula at 
the top of the left (main) branch is not cancelled, and since it cannot be in r (because 
r is strongly consistent) and cannot be z : Prop, it must be c : Peanol, and 9 has 
the form 
z : Prop 
91 (z) 
c : (Vn : N)(T 0 =N an) m^:‘i 
cmA41 : I 
cmA4lz : z. 
z : Prwcvej 
Now consider 5B2(z). Without abbreviations it is 
z : Prop 
92(z) 
Ml : (Vr : N + Prop)(rO I r(um)). 
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Case 1: The last rule of Q*(z) is (V/e). Then the top of the left branch must again 
be c : Peanol, so L&(Z) has the form 
z : Prop 
&l(Z) 
c : (&I : N)(l 0 =N an) 
z : Prop 
922(z) 
cm’ : lO=N cm’ 
m’ ’ N (Ye) 
I& : 0 =N Um’ (~‘e> 
cm’M2 : 1 
Ml : (VI : N + Prop)(rO XI r(am)).(Ve) 
But then 
z : Prop 
921(z) 
c : (%I : N)(T 0 =,t, an) 
m’ ’ N (Ve) 
z : Prop 
922(z) 
cm’ : YO=Nbm Mz : 0 =N 6112’ (ve) 
cm’M2 : _L 
cm’M2z : z 
z : Pwcvej 
is a deduction of (14) shorter than D, contrary to hypothesis. Hence, this case is 
impossible. 
Case 2: The last rule of 92 is (VTi). Then 92 is 
1 
z : Prop,[r : N -+ Prop] 
. standard proof 
921(z, r) 
N : Prop Prop : Type 
A42 : r0 3 r(am) N + Prop : Type 
(PTF - v) 
(VTi - 1) 
ir : N + Prop .M2 : (Vr : N -+ Prop)(rO > r(am)). 
Now consider $&(z, r). By the argument of Case 1, the last rule (except, of course, 
for (Eq”)) is not (Ve). Hence, it is (VTi), and &i(z, r) is 
2 
z : Prop, r : N + Prop, [u : rO] 
. / standard proof 
9211(z, r,u> 
r : N -+ Prop 0:N 
h43 : r(am) 
(ye) 
r0 : Prop (VPi-2) 
AU : r0 .M3 : r0 3 r(am), 
where M2 s lu : rO.M3. 
Now consider $921 i (z, r, u). By the argument of Case 1, the last inference is not (Ve). 
It cannot be by (VTi) or (V Pi). The only rule left is (Eq”), but this is impossible 
since r0 #* r(am). Hence, there can be no deduction of (14). q 
The theory of arithmetic we have just seen is an excellent prototype for inductively 
generated free algebras, which can all be defined by similar methods (cf. [3]). It is not 
86 J. P. Seldinl Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 83 (1997) 23-101 
strictly necessary to have definitions for the types and constants involved: the above 
theory would work just as well if N, 0, b, and R are new atomic constants (of course, 
the reduction rules for R have to be postulated in this case; we can have confidence 
that there is no problem with the strong normalization theorem if these new constants 
are assumed precisely because we can define all of them as closed terms from which 
the reduction rules for R can be deduced). If we do take them as atomic constants, 
then Peano can be interpreted as saying that type N is assigned only to terms in the 
set .Af, and so we are justified in concluding the consistency of the system with axiom 
Peano added. 
As an example of an inductively generated free algebra, let us consider lists. To 
have lists of terms of type A, we need a type List which, when applied to A, forms 
the type ListA of lists of objects of type A. We also need the empty list, nilA, and 
the function consA of type A -+ ListA -+ ListA which puts an object of type A at 
the front of a list of objects of type A to produce a new list of objects of type A. 
We will want to be able to define recursively functions on lists and objects of type A. 
For example, the function append which concatenates two lists, is defined as follows, 
where Lt and Lz are lists of type ListA and it4 : A: 
appendA(nilA)L2 E Lz, 
appendA(consAMLt)Lz G consAM(appendALtL2). 
To take another example, the function reverse which reverses the order of a list is 
defined by 
reverseALrflipAL(nilA), 
where flip is defined by 
flipA(nilA)Lz =_ L2, 
flipA(consAMLt)L2 E flipALl(consAML2), 
To make definitions like this, we need a term which plays with respect o lists the role 
that R plays with respect o N. 
It turns out to be possible to define List, nil, and cons so that these recursive 
definitions become possible: 
List 5 M . Prop. (Vu : Prop)((A -+ u -+ u) + u -+ u), 
nil=M:Prop.;lB:Prop.lf:A--+B+B.ly:B.y, 
cons=M : Prop.,?x: A.1E : ListA.m: Prop. 
kf :A+B--,B.ily:B.fx(lBfy). 
The intention is that if L =* (XI, x2,. . . ,x,) is a list in ListA, f : A -+ B + B, and 
y : B, then 
LBf y D fh(fxz(. . . (fn,y)). . .). 
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To show that this definition works, note that if h : A --t B + B and M : B, and if g is 
defined by 
g=3,1 : ListA. lBhM, 
then g has the properties 
g(nilA) D M, 
g(consAxL) D h(gL), 
for all x : A and L : ListA. This function g allows us to define append, reverse, 
and such other list functions as null and length. It is also possible to define car, but 
since there may not be any terms with type A (for example, if A is void), it must be 
defined to have three arguments, o that 
carAM(nilA) D M, 
carAM(consAxL) D x. 
I conjecture that it is possible to define cdr, but I am not certain as of this writing. 
Just as we defined N corresponding to N, so we can define 9 corresponding to 
List. The definition is as follows: 
9 s M : Prop. A.x : ListA. (Vy : ListA -+ Prop) 
((VU : A) (VZ : ListA)(yAZ 3 yA(consAuZ)) 3 yA(nilA)> yx). 
It is then easy to prove 
t- 9 : (VA : Prop)( ListA + Prop), 
FM : (VA : Prop)(9A(nilA)), 
EN : (VA : Prop)(Vlu : A)(VZ : ListA)(YAZ 3 S?A(consAuZ)), 
and 
kP : (VA : Prop)(VB : ListA -+ Prop) 
((VU : A)(VZ : ListA)(BZ 3 B(consAuZ)) 3B(nilA) >(VZ : ListA)(&F’Z 3 BZ)), 
for some closed terms M, N, and P. This gives us the desired induction property on 
lists. All we still need are axioms corresponding to Peanol and Peano2: 
(VA : Prop)(Vx : A)(VZ : ListA)(%onsAxZ =tistA nilA), 
(VA : Prop)( Vx : A)( Vy : A)( VZ : ListA)( Vm : ListA) 
(consAxZ =ListA consAym >x =A y), 
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and 
(VA : Prop)(Vx : A)(V’y : A)(Vl : ListA)(Vm : ListA) 
(consAxZ =ListA consAym > 1 =ListA m). 
I have not checked the details for any of these, but it appears that the second can be 
proved by the use of carAx. The third may not be provable as is, but can probably be 
proved in a modified form in a manner similar to the proof of Lemma 12: 
(VA : Prop)( Vx : A)(Vy : A)(VZ : ListA)(Vm : ListA) 
(.5?l> _!Zm > consAx =ListA consAym > 1 =ListA m). 
It follows that the representation of lists probably requires only the first of these, 
and this is enough like the negation of an equation between terms with distinct normal 
forms that it may possibly be proved consistent by a proof similar to that of Lemma 13. 
These details, like the definition of cdr, are left for further work. 
10. Classical logic 
In his posting to the TYPES network [33], Pottinger shows that if excluded middle 
and definite descriptions are added to TOCO, then any two terms in a small type 
(i.e., a type in Prop) are equal (in the sense of Leibniz equality). This conclu- 
sion is called “proof degeneracy”. Because of the interpretation of arithmetic, there 
is a small type in which there are terms asserted to be unequal (0 and aO), and 
hence proof degeneracy together with the assumption eeded for arithmetic implies 
inconsistency. 
Coquand [8] showed by a model theoretic proof that excluded middle in the calculus 
of constructions i consistent. In this section I prove the equivalent result that excluded 
middle without definite descriptions does not imply proof degeneracy. My method is 
proof theoretic, a variant of the -l-interpretation, and it provides an alternative proof 
of Coquand’s consistency result. 
Coquand [8] also proved that excluded middle and strong sums imply proof de- 
generacy. Garrel Pottinger has pointed out to me (private communication) that the 
strong sums, when interpreted under the formulas-as-types isomorphism, have the dis- 
junction property. Since this property is known to be characteristic of constructive 
logic and incompatible with classical logic, this result of Coquand is really a con- 
firmation of what we should expect of classical logic. The result of Pottinger [33], 
on the other hand, is unwelcome, since both excluded middle and definite descrip- 
tions are desirable in some circumstances. The result proved here shows that we 
are more likely to have to give up definite descriptions than excluded 
middle. 
To get classical ogic, I will use the assumption 
cl : (Vf4 : Prop)(-34 3 u), 
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which implies classical logic but cannot occur in a strongly consistent environment. 
To simplify the notation, let CL be an abbreviation for 
(Vu : Prop)(,124 3 u). 
We want each occurrence of cl : CL as an assumption to occur in a subdeduction 
of the form 
a 
cl : CL 
CIA : 
A ’ Prop (V/e) MT17A 
TTA>A 
clAM : A. 
(ye) 
This is not a difficult restriction to satisfy, since we can replace 
91 
cl : CL 
CIA : 
A : Prop (ye) 
-1A >A, 
where the conclusion is not a major premise for (Ve), by 
(VPi - 
where 92 is 
A : Prop ‘: Prop (PPF _ “) 
-A : Prop 
VA : Prop, 
9” 
I: Prop (PPF _ v) 
and where % is 
n 
Prop : Type 
I: Prop; 
ix : Propl (TPF _ n) 
also, if cl : CL is not the major premise for an inference by (Ve), then we can replace 
it by 
[X : Prop] 
clxy : x (ve) 77xTbrop 
ly : 77x.cLxy : llx>X 
(VPi - I) 
Prop : Type 
Ix : Prop. ly : 71x. clxy : CL, 
(VTi - 2) 
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where 9, is 
9” 
x : Prop I: Prop cPPF _ vj 
-3 : Prop 
7-a : Prop. 
9” 
I: Prop 
(PPF - v) 
A deduction in which both of these replacements have been made systemmatically in 
all possible places will be called prepared. Note that in preparing a deduction, we 
replace terms in which cl occurs by terms to which they are q-convertible. 
Now consider in a prepared deduction a subdeduction of the form 
Since there is a subdeduction of A : Prop, A is a type; hence, it is either simple or 
compound. 
The strategy is to follow the idea of [35] for classical logic, and eliminate occurrences 
of subdeductions like those above in which A is compound. Thus, assume that A is 
(Vy : B)C. We need a lemma. 
Lemma 14. Let r be a well-formed environment, and suppose that 
where A =* (Vy : B)C and X =* K. Then 
TFB:K’ and r,y:BkC:~. 
Proof. A straightforward induction on the normalized deduction of r I-A : X. 0 
Now by this lemma and 91 above, it follows that there are deductions 
93 
B : K, 
y:B 
94(Y 1 
C : Prop. 
Then we can transform 
into the following: 
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93 g5 92 
B : K, ly : B. C : (Vy : B)Prop, M : --A, 
94 
. 
“‘,1,“: _zi QEp (Ve) 
%5(B,ly :B.C,My) 
Y(B,ly : B.C,M,y) : --C (ve) 93 
clCI(B, Ix : B. C,M,N) : C 
ly : B. clC_T(B, Ix : B C,M, N) : (Vx : B)C, 
B:K(vKi-l) 
where 9s is 
C : Prop 
B’K (k-2) 
Ay : B. C : (Vy : B)Prop, 
F(u’, v’, 24, v) is 
3,w : 3’~. u(ly : (Vx : u’)(v’x) . w(yv)), 
and Qb(u’, v’, U, v) is the obvious normalized deduction of 
24’ : K, 0’ : (Vx : u’)Prop, u : 17( tlx : u’)(v’x), v : u’ t kqu’, v’, 2.4, u) : -v’v. 
In the special case in which A =* I, we have a special transformation: we replace 
9” 
cl : CL 
cl J-: 
-L: Prop (Ye), fy I 
--I>1 
cl A-M :I We) 
al 
91 [X L, 
M: 11 I ix:l 
” Prop (Vpi _ 1) 
.x: 11 
M(kc :-I- .x) :I. (ye) 
If we repeatedly apply these transformations to a deduction, we will eventually reach 
a point at which in all occurrences of a part of a deduction of the form 
A is a simple type. Of course, this will have replaced terms of the form clAA4 for 
compound types A of the form (t/y : B)C by 
A.y : B.clCF(B,ix: B.C,M,N) 
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and cl I M by M(Au :I . u). If we repeat hese replacements, we will eventually elim- 
inate all occurrences of the assumption cl : CL as the major premise for an inference 
by (Ye) in which the term of the minor premise is a compound type. We can go on to 
eliminate all occurrences of this assumption by changing some small simple types B to 
--.B; this will convert a deduction of F, cl : CL FM : A to a deduction of r’ FM* : A’, 
where r’ and A’ are obtained from r and A by replacing some small simple types 
B by l,B and changing some of the terms. Note that all the terms so changed have 
occurrences of cl in them; it follows from the subject-construction property (see [18, 
Notes 14.18 and 15.12 and Remark 16.371 and [37, p. 3011; it says that a deduction 
follows the construction of the term) that if a term without an occurrence of cl occurs 
in a type in r or in A, then that term is unchanged, and so is any type to which it 
is proved to belong in the deduction. These terms occurring in the types of r or A 
(whether changed or not) will be called type arguments. 
Since it is trivial to prove in constructive logic that A t- ,,A, we can put all this in 
the form of the following theorem. 
Theorem 22. Zf there is a deduction of T,cl : CL t-M : A, and tf Z’ and A’ are 
obtained from Z and A by (1) replacing every simple small type B by -V-B provided 
that B occurs in Z or A but does not occur inside an occurrence of the type I or in 
the type of a type argument in which cl does not occur, and (2) by changing type 
arguments in which cl does occur, then for some term M* there is a deduction of 
S l-M* : A’. 
Now suppose that we have a deduction cl : CLAM :I (where r is empty). Then 
by the theorem, there is a deduction 9 of FM :A_. Since there is no such deduc- 
tion (by the normalization theorem), this gives us a proof of Coquand’s consistency 
result. 
Corollary 22.1. Classical logic is consistent in the calculus of constructions. 
Arithmetic is also consistent with classical ogic. To prove this, it is enough to prove 
that cl : CL,peanol : (Vn : N)(Tan =N 0) is consistent. 
Theorem 23. Let Z be a strongly consistent environment in which all simple types 
which have universal prefixes are large, Then 
T,cl : CL, peanol : (Vn : N)(Tan =N 0) 
is consistent. 
Proof. Suppose there is a term A4 such that 
F,cl : CL,c: (‘dn: N)(yun=N O)kM : void. 
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Then by Theorem 22 there is a term M’ such that 
r’,c : (Vn : N)l(Vz : N -+ Prop)(llz(on) + 17~0) FM’ : void. 
(Recall that P =A Q converts to (Vz : A 4 Prop)(zP + zQ).) It is not hard to see that 
r’ is strongly negation consistent. Now in a normal deduction of 
I”,c : (Vn : N)l(Vz : N + Prop)(llz(an) + T-Jz~)!-M’ : void, 
the top of the left branch must be 
c : (Vn : N)l(Vz : N -+ Prop)(7Tz(an) -+ WZO), 
and the minor premise for an inference by (Ve) is 
Q : (VZ : N + Prop)(Tlz(aU) + ~=0), 
where there is an assumption U : N. This is proved impossible by the following 
lemma. q 
Lemma 15. Zf r is strongly negation consistent, and $for some term M 
T,c : (Vn : N)l(Vz : N + Prop)(Tlz(an) -+ 11~0) 
t-M : (Vz : A --+ Prop)(llzR + TzS), 
then R =* S. 
Proof. Assume that D is a normalized eduction as in the lemma and that there is no 
proper subdeduction of something of this form whose undischarged assumptions are in 
some strongly negation consistent environment or are of the given form for peanol. 
If the last inference in D (Except for (Eq”)) is (Ve), then the top of the left branch 
must be 
c : (Vn : N)T(VZ : N -+ Prop)(77z(an) 3 7-TzO), 
and then the deduction ending in the minor premise violates the assumptions about D. 
In fact, this shows that 
c : (Vn : N)l(Vz : N -+ Prop)(TTz(an) + TYZO) 
cannot occur anywhere in D at the top of the left branch, and, since D is normalized, 
this implies that it is not used in the deduction. It follows (by repeating this argu- 
ment about subdeductions ending in (Ve)) that we can decompose D until we have a 
deduction of 
T,z : A + Prop,u : TTZR,U : -zStQ : void. 
By Theorem 19, this is only possible if R =* S. 0 
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11. Sets and functions 
We spoke in Section 9 of the predicate N of natural numbers. But most mathe- 
maticians prefer to think of the set of natural numbers. This point of view is easily 
accommodated in the theory of constructions, ince it is easy to think of a predicate 
as a set. This material is based on the work of Huet [20, Ch 12; 211 
Thus, suppose we have some type U : Prop or U : Type. Then we may think of 
U as the current universe. Sets over U are defined to be predicates of type U + Prop. 
More formally, we may define 
Setu 5 U ---f Prop. 
In terms of this definition, JV : SetN and, if A : Prop, dipA : SetLwA. If A : Setu, then 
wedefinexEAtobeAx.Theset{n:U]E} is defined to be Ix : U. E. Inclusion of 
set A in set B can be defined by 
A C B = (Vx : U)(x E A >x E B) 
and the corresponding extensional equality by 
A=,,B-AGBABCA. 
From this definition, the axiom of extensionality follows immediately: 
(VA : Set,)(VB: Set,)((Vx: U)(x EA HX E B)>A=,,B), 
where A H B is (A > B) A(B > A). This is false if we replace =ex by =seto , since the 
latter is intensional. Similarly, =(I is intensional on U. Furthermore, =U corresponds 
to the definition of equality in set theories, since 
(VA : SetU)(x E A 3 y E A) 
becomes, when abbreviations are removed, 
(VA : U ---f Prop)(Ax EJ Ay) =* x =u y. 
Huet [20, Ch. 12; 211 uses this to define an intensional equality on U. 
Many of the usual sets and set operations can be easily defined. For example, 
0=(x: Ull}, 
so we have the axiom of the empty set, 
{x} = {v: ulY=z/x), 
A~B={x:U~XEAAXEB}, 
AUB~{~:U~XEAVXEB}, 
from which it follows that 
{x,y}=*{z: U]z=(IxVz=oy}, 
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which gives us the axiom of pairing, and 
When no confusion results, we can leave out U and write {x 1 E}, Set, etc. 
It is important to remember the constructive nature of the logic. This means that 
the set operations given above are not exactly like those in ordinary mathematics. For 
example, we have 
but not, in general, the converse. 
One operation on sets that we do not have here is the power set operation. For the 
power set of A, i.e. the set of all subsets of A, is defined by 
CPA E M: Set.BgA, 
and the type of PA is not Set, which is U + Prop, but instead Set + Prop. Terms 
of type Set + Prop will be called classes, and we will give the formal definition 
Clas.su E Setu -+ Prop. 
Since U can be replaced by Setu, all set operations are also class operations. We can 
define other class operations, for example, 
n C E {X 1 (VA : Set)(CA 3 x E A)}, 
and 
U C E {x 1 (IA : Set)(CA Ax E A)}. 
We can also define the singleton in terms of classes: 
{x} E ()(A4 : Set.x E A). 
With these definitions, 
We know metatheoretically that the closed terms which are elements of the set JV are 
exactly the closed terms of type N (modulo q-conversion). Thus, the set JV represents 
the type N in a special way. There is no known uniform method of defining sets to 
represent types for arbitrary types that does not require extra axioms. It is, of course, 
possible to add an axiom of the form &It4 for each closed term A4 : A, where A is a 
type and d is the set intended to represent it, but many of these axioms are likely to 
upset the proof of strong normalization. 
Most mathematicians think of functions as sets of ordered pairs, but this conception 
is not really appropriate here. For we already have functions built into the theory of 
constructions as primitive. A function is simply a term assigned to a type of the form 
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(VX : A)B. Functions can, of course, be elements of sets, especially if the sets corre- 
spond to types the way JY corresponds to N. Since a set corresponding to a type A is 
a term of type A + Prop, a set of functions from type A to type B is a term of type 
(A + B) -P Prop. To say that a function f : U --) U is a function from set A to set 
B, we use the type 
(Vx: U)(xEA>fxEB). 
It follows that the set of functions from set A to set B is 
2f: U-+U.(Vx: l_J)(xcA>fxEB). 
If f : U + U, then for A : Set we can define 
Preserve fA E (Vx : U)(x E A 3 fx E A). 
In terms of this operator, the induction axiom Peano can be written as 
Peano =* (VA : N + Prop)((Preserve aA) I 0 E A I( Vn : N)(n E A)), 
and the definition of X as 
Jf=*An:N.(VA:N+Prop)(PreseweaA>OEAInEA). 
This may help to show how to standardize the definition of inductively defined free 
algebras. 
Remark 17. It may be interesting to see what axioms of set theory are true in this 
interpretation. Since the underlying logic is constructive, let us consider constructive set 
theory. In particular, consider IZF as given in Beeson [ 1, p. 1641. We do not, of course, 
have a predicate for set which, together with Jlr, satisfies Beeson’s axiom Al: N(x) V 
S(x) or his A4 (x E y > S(y). But his A2 (-@/(x) A S(x)) is true metatheoretically, 
since the types N and Set are always disjoint. Furthermore, the formulas corresponding 
to axioms A3, A5, and his entire group B are all provable, as we have seen in Section 9. 
Let us therefore proceed to group C, the set theoretic axioms. We have already seen 
that axioms Cl (extensional@), C2 (empty set), and C3 (pairing) are provable, at 
least with the right equality for Cl. For the rest of the list, we have the following: 
Axiom C4. Infinity. This depends on U. If U is N, then it can be easily proved 
since J1’ is the required infinite set. 
Axiom C5. Union. We cannot have a set of sets, but we can have a class of sets, 
and so we can prove the following variant of this axiom: 
(Vd : Class)@B : Set)(Vx : U)(x E B tf (IA : Set)(A E &Ax E A)). 
The proof comes by letting B be 
2x : U.(3A : Set)(A E d Ax E A). 
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Axiom C6. Separation. We can prove 
(V$J : U -+ Prop)(VA : Set)@B : Set)(Vx : U)(x E B - x E A A 4x) 
by taking B G Lx : U .x E A A 4x. 
Axiom C7. Power set. We can prove 
(Vx : Set)@ : Class)(Vz : Set)@ E u ++ z Cx). 
This is like our version of the axiom of union above in referring to classes. But unlike 
the axiom of union, it seems to lead us out of sets. For this reason, I think we must 
regard this axiom as failing here. 
Axiom C8. E-induction. To state this axiom, we need a predicate A which applies 
to both sets and their elements. For this A, we would need both A : U + Prop and 
A : Set -+ Prop, and this is impossible. Thus, we cannot even state this axiom here. 
Axiom C9. Collection. We can prove a form of this axiom, 
(V+ : U --j U -+ Prop)(Vx : Set)((V,y : U)(y E x 3(3.2 : U)(+yz)) 
3 (32~ : Set)(V’y : U)(y E x 3(32 : U)(Z E 24 A c#J~z)), 
by taking u to be 
Note. The idea for checking the axioms of set theory in this way is due to Edward 
Belaga. In the summer of 1991, after reading his [2] in which it is suggested that the 
power set axiom only holds for countable sets, it occurred to me that because of the 
problems in interpreting the power set axiom in the calculus of constructions it might 
be worth trying to represent this alternative set theory. I did some preliminary work on 
this in [40], but this work is still much too preliminary to publish, and unfortunately 
I have not had time to return to this topic since then. 
This much set theory is sufficient for most practical mathematical purposes, but from 
the point of view of a set theorist it is incomplete. Its major weakness is that if A is a 
set, PA is not a set but a class; in the standard set theories it is also a set. To make this 
a set, we would need to have Set include not only the terms in U + Prop but also 
in (U -9 Prop) -+ Prop, ((U -+ Prop) + Prop) + Prop, etc. This can be represented 
in the theory of constructions as follows (this is not done in [20] or [21]): first define 
Set, E U -+ Prop, 
Set,+l = Set, -+ Prop. 
Then we want to introduce a new type Set which will be assigned to terms in any of 
the types Set,. This requires that each type Set,, be a subtype of Set. 
There is a general method of making type A a subtype of type B: it is to take as an 
assumption 
1,x : A.x : A+ B. 
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From this assumption and M : A, we get (LX : A .x)M : B, and clearly (Lx : A .x)44 
represents the same object as M; in fact, it reduces to M. Assumptions of this form 
have not been considered so far in the theory of constructions, and cannot occur in 
well-formed environments. However, they have been considered in connection with 
ordinary type assignment; see [13, pp. 304 and 4531, where they are called proper 
inclusions. Furthermore, conditions under which these assumptions are compatible with 
the normal form theorem are given in [36, Remark 2, p. 231. It is possible to extend 
condition (i) of that Remark to TOCO. 
Theorem 24. Let r be a well-formed environment, and let r’ be a sequence of as- 
sumptions each of which has the form 
ilx:A.x:A-+B, 
where B is an atomic constant, the assumption B : K occurs in r, and B --) C is not 
a type in r’ for any type C. Then any deduction of 
r.r?-kt : A 
is strongly normalizable and both M and A have normal forms. 
Proof. We begin by proving that the required deductions are SN. Begin by replacing 
in each assumption in r’ the term In : A .x by a variable which does not occur 
free in either r or r’, using a distinct variable for each such assumption. The resulting 
deductions are all SN by Theorem 11. Hence, the deductions in which we are interested, 
which are all obtained by substituting terms for variables, are also all SN. 
Now let us consider the terms in these deductions. These terms may contain redexes 
of the form 
(Ax : A .x)M. 
A contraction will replace this redex by M. What we need to know is that this will 
not produce a new redex. This could only happen if the original redex occurred in a 
subterm of the form 
(Ax : A .x)MNIN2.. .N,, 
and since the type of 
(Lx : A .x)M 
is B, which is by hypothesis a new constant and hence not convertible to the form 
(V’y : C)D, this is impossible. q 
Now, in order to interpret a set theory in which the power set of a set is a set, 
we need only define Set, as indicated above for each n 2 1, define Set to be a new 
atomic constant, assume Set : Prop or Set : Type, and then assume 
ix : Set, .x : Set, 4 Set 
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for each n 2 1. (This involves an infinite number of assumptions, but they can all be de- 
scribed in a finite manner, and so it is not unreasonable to suppose that this can be im- 
plemented.) It follows from what we have just proved that this is consistent; for Set is 
essentially the union of all the Set,, and in deductions, it will be possible to replace Set 
by the union of a finite number of the Set, and thus avoid using any new assumptions. 
Remark 18. Note that with this new definition of Set, certain axioms can no longer 
be proved in the foxm stated in Remark 17. This is because we cannot infer from an 
assumption of the form x : Set that there is an n with x : Set,, and it follows that 
we cannot prove M E x : Prop even when we have M : U. This affects, in particular, 
the axioms of union, separation, power set, and collection. However, we can carry out 
the constructions involved in these axioms metatheoretically: thus, if we have M : Set 
for a term M, and this comes from M : Set,, then the term representing the union of 
M has the right type to be a set. A similar result will hold for separation, power set 
(and the power set of any set in some Set, is a set), and collection. The axiom of 
E-induction can now be stated, but it will not be possible to prove it. 
Note that we are doing all of this set theory without any assumptions. This inter- 
pretation is thus a consistency proof of a part of set theory. 
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